Tag Archives: china

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

US-China climate deal: at last the big players are talking the right language Updated for 2026





Some great news at last, as China and the US announce a secretly negotiated deal to reduce their carbon emissions.

After years of seeming to get nowhere at all it looks like we have the beginnings of meaningful commitments.

If the rest of the world can fall in line with the combined targets of China, the US and EU, and if between us all we can enforce them, we would actually have progress. Not success, but for the first time we would have better-than-nothing global progress on climate change.

But just before we all relax, lets get things into perspective. Global emissions have been on a mathematically predictable exponential trajectory for at least 160 years.

The CO2 power law – doubling time 39 years

Cumulative CO2 emissions (broadly speaking that’s what determines the temperature change) continue to double every 39 years (see graph, right). Nothing that anyone has done to date has succeeded in making even the faintest detectable change in that.

To be blunt, our species has so far not demonstrated any ability whatsoever to influence global emissions growth through deliberate action on climate change. Savings in one place have simply popped up elsewhere.

And if we stay on our age-old trajectory we will shoot through the likely threshold of two degrees in the mid-2040s.

By that I mean that by about 2045 we will pass the point at which we will probably experience more than a 2°C rise even if no-one anywhere in the world ever again set fire to any coal, oil or gas.

And, roughly speaking, 39 years after that we will crash through the 4°C threshold which humans would be very likely to find extremely unpleasant.

Of course we don’t really know all that much about what level of temperature change will cause us what level of suffering and death. We don’t understand the climate discontinuities that we might trigger, and we don’t know how good we will be at adapting to change and we don’t know how good we will be at preserving world order if things get tough.

The mainstream consensus is that 2°C entails significant risk of something nasty happening while 4°C is probably very nasty indeed. No one knows for sure.

Coming off the curve

What we need is a global constraint on greenhouse gases. And it needs to be rapid enough to keep temperatures as close to 2°C rise as possible. This much, thankfully, seems to be uncontested these days among people who talk any sense on climate change.

So how far do the latest US and China pledges take us? If (and it’s still a big ‘if’) the world falls quickly in line with the US (27% cuts by 2025), China (peak by 2030 – by which time their emissions could be enormous) and EU (40% cut by 2030) announcements we will come off the exponential curve but still fly through the 2℃ threshold and well beyond.

Coming off the curve would be a huge achievement but not nearly enough.

So when I say we might actually stand a chance of getting somewhere, I don’t mean that things are looking rosy. But I do mean this gives me real hope, as big players are talking the right language at last.

All we need now is more of the same – and to make sure the words turn into enforced action. That will be enormously challenging but it is radically more hopeful position than the situation we have been in in which sticky plasters have been proposed, no amount of which could help.

What we need from here

  1. We need the rest of the world to come into the fold with similar commitments, so we get a leak-proof deal on leaving fuel in the ground. Any countries that don’t participate will probably end up growing their emissions to undo efforts made elsewhere, because that is how the system dynamics work to negate piecemeal actions.
  2. Binding targets need tightening up for everyone, beyond what is currently on the table, to take us a lot closer to topping out at 2°C.
  3. The deal needs enforcing. This is going to be tough, remember that the exponential global emissions curve has proved incredibly resilient to date.
  4. All the greenhouse gases need to be properly included in the plan.
  5. We need to head off a global dash for biofuels which will undoubtedly be at the expense of feeding the world’s poorest if left to market forces. Some smart and robust agreements are going to be needed on land use for biofuels.

While all this is being put in place we can start investing in the technologies we will urgently need – redirecting the money we have been channelling into fossil fuel research and development.

To sum up, the announcement is very encouraging. There may still be a long way to go yet and we all need to push hard for next year’s Paris talks to put it all in place – but it is starting to look as if it might actually be worth the effort.

 


 

Mike Berners-Lee is a Visiting Researcher at Lancaster University, and the founding director of Small World Consulting which helps organisations understand and respond to the climate change agenda.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




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