Tag Archives: coal

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

China’s fossil fuel emissions fell 3% in 2014 Updated for 2026





China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% in 2014, according to newly released official Chinese energy data.

The data confirms earlier projections of a fall in coal use and 1% reduction in Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning according to calculations based on the data (excel spreadsheet).

An initial analysis by Glen Peters suggests that equates to a 0.7% drop in overall emissions.

This is the first fall in China’s emissions from oil, gas and coal burning since the Asian economic crisis more than 15 years ago. It’s also the biggest recorded fall in 30 years, and the first time on record that emission fell while total energy consumption grew.

Coal consumption growth in China has been slowing down since 2012 suggesting that China’s coal use is no longer rising in line with economic output – so-called ‘de-coupling’.

Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2014, coal consumption growth slowed from an average of 6.1% per year between 2007-2011, to 2.6% on average between 2012-2013, while GDP growth averaged 10.5% and 7.7% per year, respectively.

Has China’s coal burn peaked?

China’s coal consumption growth was responsible for more than half of global CO2 emission growth in the past 10 years.

The fall in China’s coal consumption comes as China has set new global records for wind and solar installations and seen an increase in both economy-wide and power plant efficiency.

Ambitious policies to control coal use, spurred by the air pollution crisis, along with policies to diversify the economy away from energy-intensive industries, are strongly constraining coal consumption.

The country also appears to be moving away from plans to reduce pollution in urban areas by gasifying coal in more remote locations due to concerns over economic viability.

Though China’s coal use is unlikely to continue falling year on year an analysis by Greenpeace suggests that full implementation of China’s existing energy targets, including targets for renewable energy and controlling total energy consumption, could see coal use peak by 2020.

China recently required four provinces in the key economic regions to set absolute coal consumption reduction targets, in addition to four others that already have ambitious targets, the provinces consume over 600 million metric tons of coal per year, almost as much as India.

Coal generation capacity increasing – a contradiction?

While China’s coal consumption fell in 2014, coal-fired power generating capacity continues to grow rapidly. This apparent contradiction has led some observers to conclude that China’s coal consumption growth is bound to resume.

But the evidence suggests otherwise. Instead the continued buildup of coal-fired power plants represents an investment bubble that will burst as overcapacity becomes too large to ignore.

If there is one factoid that every media consumer knows about energy in China, it must be that the country is ‘building one coal power plant per week’.

While coal-fired power generation capacity growth has slowed from the peak years – 2006 saw the equivalent of 1.5 large units added every week – the rate of coal-fired power plant additions and construction initiations in China is still breathtaking

In 2014 39 GW were added, or three 1,000MW units every four weeks, up from 36 GW in 2013.

Coal plants built – but not used 

At the same time, power generation from coal fell by approximately 1.6% in 2014, due to record increases in power generation from hydropower, wind, solar, nuclear and gas, along with slower power consumption growth – contributing to the 2.9% overall fall in coal burning.

In fact, coal-fired capacity growth has outstripped coal-fired generation growth since 2011, leading to dramatically reduced capacity utilization (see graph, above right) and financial pain to power plant operators. The headline making the rounds in China is that capacity utilization, at 54%, was at its lowest level since the reforms of 1978, when statistics began to be made available.

The Obama – Xi deal on peaking China’s CO2 emissions before 2030 has grabbed the headlines in English-speaking media, leaving many observers with the impression that China is planning to slack for another 15 years before starting to pull its weight in cutting CO2.

However, real action is in the implementation of China’s energy targets for 2020 and the air pollution action plans for 2017. For the power sector, the most significant target is the objective for non-fossil energy to make up 15% of all energy consumed in China.

Hitting the 15% target will require raising share of renewable energy and nuclear power in power generation from 22% in 2013 to 33-35% in 2020. Gas-fired power generation is also forecast by the IEA to grow to around 5% of total power generation, implying that the share of coal will shrink to about 60% in 2020, from 72% in 2013.

This will require almost doubling non-fossil power generation from 2014 to 2020, meaning that, on average, non-fossil power generation will have increased as much as it did in 2014, every year until 2020.

As in so many other respects, the radical changes in 2014 were not a one-off anomaly, but the ‘new normal’.

No room for new coal power plants – so why build them?

As a result of booming non-fossil power generation, even assuming GDP growth of 7% per year until 2020, growth in coal-fired power generation will be limited to around 1.5% per year on average, slowing down towards 2020 as non-fossil generation additions are ramped up.

Together with a targeted 0.7% per year reduction in coal use per unit of power generated, this means that coal use growth in the power sector will average less than 1% and will stabilize before 2020. If capacity utilization is to return to financially sustainable levels, there is room for little more capacity to be added until 2020.

To grasp why coal-fired power plants can still get built in the face of a worsening overcapacity problem, it is necessary to understand the basics of China’s economic model.

The country’s growth miracle has been based on an economic system designed to enable extremely high levels of investment spending, particularly by state-owned companies and local governments.

These actors have a very liberal access to near-zero interest loans from state-owned banks, and state-owned companies are generally not required to pay dividends to the state, enabling (or forcing) them to re-invest their profits.

Investments do not need to be wise or profitable

Banks exercise minimal due diligence on loans, which have implicit government backing. As a result, investment spending now amounts to over $4 trillion per year, making up a staggering 50% of China’s GDP, higher than any other major economy in history, and compared to around 20% in developed economies.

This model served China well for decades, enabling the growth miracle and lifting hundreds of millions from poverty. However, finding profitable and sensible investment projects worth trillions of dollars every year is bound to become harder and harder as the investment boom goes on.

Recently published research estimated that 67 trillion yuan ($11 trillion) has been spent on projects that generated no or almost no economic output – ghost cities being the most famous example.

In this context, it is not too hard to see how investment in coal-fired power plants can speed way ahead of demand growth.

A new coal-fired power plant will still generate power and revenue even if there is overcapacity, as the lower capacity utilization gets spread across the entire coal power fleet and across all power plant operators.

What does continued coal-fired power buildup mean for the climate?

The conventional assumption in power business is that once a coal-fired power plant or other capital-intensive generating asset gets built, it will run pretty much at full steam for 40 years or more. Even if there is overcapacity at the moment, demand growth will raise utilization and the existing capacity will crowd out future investment.

However, this is not how things work in China. The government is not going to scrap the internationally pledged 15% non-fossil energy target for 2020 because of excess coal-fired capacity. Rather the overcapacity will lead to losses for power generators and will be eliminated by closing down older plants, as has happened with coal mining, steel and cement already.

Therefore, continued investment in coal-fired power plants does not mean locking in more coal-burning. It does, however, mean massive economic waste, and a missed opportunity to channel the investment spending into renewable energy, enabling even faster growth.

Furthermore, the underutilized coal-fired capacity can exacerbate the conflict between coal and variable renewable energy in the grid, as grid operators are known to curtail renewable power in favor of coal.

Hence, investment in coal-fired power plants needs to be rapidly scaled back by restricting approvals and finance. The first step has already been taken with China banning new coal power plants in its three key economic regions, home to one third of currently operating coal-fired capacity.

 


 

Lauri Myllyvirta writes for Greenpeace EnergyDesk on energy and climate issues in China and elsewhere.

This article combines two articles by Lauri Myllyvirta originally published on Greenpeace EnergyDesk:

 

Sources: The energy data is from China Statistical Yearbook 2014 except 2014 growth rates from National Bureau of Statistics of China: STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2014 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. February 26, 2015. CO2 emissions calculated using IPCC default emission factors. Oveall emissions data via @glenpeters. Graph of coal power plant utilization compiled from China Electricity Council statistical releases.

 

 




390825

Fossil fuel divestment backlash forces the question: Which side are you on? Updated for 2026





A crowd gathered in the cold near Wall Street on Friday to call for New York’s divestment from fossil fuels. (Flickr / 350)

If you’ve been to a major protest in the last 10 years, chances are you’ve heard the iconic chorus of Which Side Are You On? floating out from the crowd.

While it’s been covered many times, the song’s potent message originally emerged from Appalachia’s brutal Coal Wars, labor struggles between miners and coal companies that stretched roughly from the 1890s through the 1930s.

At the time, union members would regularly find themselves blacklisted and evicted from their homes in the company owned-and-operated towns that dotted the Appalachian Mountains through much of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Those found to be affiliated with the union – often the United Mineworkers, or UMW – were pushed out of city limits by armed thugs, usually paid by some combination of the coal companies themselves and business-friendly sheriff’s departments.

There are no neutrals here!

One of the most memorable sites of conflict in the Coal Wars was Harlan County, Kentucky. On Feb. 16, 1931, in the throes of the Great Depression, the Black Mountain Coal Company announced a 10% wage cut, sparking a walkout among miners and a majority vote to unionize under the UMW. The striking workers soon found themselves embroiled in a pitched battle with both the coal operators and the county sheriff, J.H. Blair.

“Which Side Are You On?” was written just hours after a mob hired by Blair entered the home of its author, Harlan County resident Florence Reece, looking to assassinate her husband. A noted UMW activist, Sam Reece had heard about the attack hours earlier and fled Harlan, leaving Florence and their seven children terrorized as Blair’s men ransacked the house.

Reeling from the assault, Florence “tore a sheet from a calendar on the wall” and penned one of the song’s lesser known lines: “They say in Harlan County there are no neutrals there. You’ll either be a union man or a thug for J.H. Blair.”

Now, as a new generation of organizers picks its own fight with the fossil fuel industry, Reece’s words have never been more relevant. In the last few days, oil, coal and natural gas executives have gone on the defensive, attempting to discredit campus and community divestment campaigners.

The American Energy Alliance took to Twitter earlier this month to disseminate the hashtag #DivestmentTruth and encourage people to “take a stand against divestment!”

The ‘campaign’ Big Green Radicalsa project of right-wing public relations mastermind Richard Berman, has surfaced to criticize environmental organizations’ ties to everything from “dark money” to the Kremlin. They even made a surreal cartoon about Americans’ tortured love affair with oil drums.

The Independent Petroleum Association of America, a national trade association of oil and natural gas producers, released a report and Wall Street Journal op-ed outlining the “costs of divestment”, which they say amount to $3.2 billion each year among university endowments.

But as Rolling Stone journalist Tim Dickinson reported, there is no such evidence. In fact, he cites financial professionals whose models show no penalty for dumping fossil fuel stock.

The fossil fuel industry knows its situation is desperate

There are a few things that might explain the industry’s newfound anxiety: the largest US refinery strike in more than three decades, plummeting oil prices, and not-so-sunny prospects about what climate change means for unhinged economic growth.

The industry, as told through the American Energy Alliance, also knows exactly why divestment is so threatening to their business model: “By ridiculing natural gas, coal and oil companies as ‘Public Enemy Number One’ – destructive of the planet itself – divestment activists try to force companies into defensive positions for which there is no defense (no one is arguing that we should destroy the planet).”

Still, it’s not as if industry executives are somehow pulling the strings behind all of this backlash. Conservatives and liberals alike have voiced opposition to the movement, albeit for different reasons.

The nature of polarization is that it forces everyone – not just opponents and movement-affiliated organizations – to choose a side. As the debate permeates mainstream news sources, increasingly large sections of society are made to take a firm stance, one way or another. Cameron Fenton, 350.org’s Canadian Tar Sands organizer, made the same point earlier this week in a Huffington Post article:

“The people in charge have avoided the critical decision on whether or not their institution should continue to prop up a climate-wrecking industry … but these attacks on divestment have taken away this coveted ‘neutral’ ground.”

No more sitting on the fence!

Thus far, college administrators have tried to have it both ways: denounce the problem and the proposed solutions alike.

Faced with a groundswell of support for divestment, administrations have eagerly heralded institutional recycling initiatives, LEED-certified sustainable building projects and ‘green’ lifestyle choices as more effective tactics for dialing down the crisis – anything, that is, but divestment.

Last week, Gregory Brown, Swarthmore College’s Vice President for Finance and Administration, rejected the majority of students’ call to divest, emphasizing “the need to focus not on divestment from the producers of fossil fuels but on the consumers of such fuels.”

On this issue, colleges have found their interests more aligned with the fossil fuel industry than with their students, faculty, staff and alumni, a majority of whom, on many campuses, have signed on in support of divestment.

It may not be too long before well-meaning, otherwise progressive college presidents quote industry-backed reports from the likes of the Independent Petroleum Association of America as a buffer against divestment advocates, maybe even inviting representatives of fossil fuel companies to their campuses to discuss the true value of their investments and consult with them on counter-strategies.

These dynamics are nothing new. In fact, this sort of polarization is a bittersweet marker of victory for the movement. At the very least, it’s a sign that divesters are doing something right.

‘Sometimes it is necessary to dramatize an issue’

In the spring of 1960, students in Nashville, Tennesee, had just kicked off a wave of lunch counter sit-ins that would spread throughout the South. The students have faced regular attacks from white mobs, who pulled them violently from their seats and beat them to the ground.

On April 17, two months into the Nashville campaign, Martin Luther King Jr. was in Washington DC as a guest on ‘Meet the Press‘. To give a sense for the show’s tenor, the first question asked was if “the sit-in strikes are doing the race, the Negro race, more harm than good?”

The rest of the segment proceeded along similar lines, prompting King to defend the campaign’s use of nonviolent direct action, if not its very right to exist. The Nashville students, including Selma campaign architect Diane Nash and now-Congressmen John Lewis, had recently extended their campaign to include a boycott of segregated downtown businesses.

Midway through the segment, Lawrence Spivak – the show’s producer and a regular panelist – turned to King. Referring to the boycott, he asked, “Wouldn’t you be on stronger grounds … if you refused to buy at those stores and if you called upon white people of the country to follow you?” In other words, why not just boycott?

As he had to similar questions throughout the program, King responded resolutely, saying, “sometimes it is necessary to dramatize an issue because many people are not aware of what’s happening … If you didn’t have the sit-ins, you wouldn’t have this dramatic – and not only this dramatic, but this mass demonstration of – the dissatisfaction of the Negro with the whole system of segregation.”

The point, here, is not to draw shaky comparisons between the civil rights movement and the fossil fuel divestment movement. The ‘Meet the Press’ panelists, in all likelihood, were not leading White Citizens Councils or Klan chapters. Many likely considered themselves liberals.

The actions of the civil rights movement dramatized, as King said, the issue of race in America, illustrating its ugly, virulent nature by bringing the crisis of structural discrimination to white audiences – however progressive they were – for whom it had been easy to avoid.

Being a moderate on desegregation became virtually impossible: you either stood with the nonviolent demonstrators being beaten in the streets, or with the police and mobs that were attacking them. Civil rights campaigners would come to win the battle for public opinion, in part, by making that choice clear.

And even if the movement’s most ambitious aims were not achieved, it created a new normal in which obviously denying African Americans the right to vote or use public facilities was no longer politically, socially or economically viable.

The challenge is to polarize – and win!

Polarization is inherently risky. There’s no sure way of telling how the public will react. Rather than convincing administrators, or even the fossil fuel industry, of their wrongs, divestment campaigners should be convincing everyone that the movement is right.

As one crucial part of a broader movement for climate justice, divestment is looking to effect nothing short of a fundamental shift in our society’s relationship to the planet and the economy: to bring about a new normal. Ironically, the industry and its supporters understand this more deeply than many of their opponents.

Shifting paradigms and cultural landscapes means shifting popular consciousness, not that of the worst actors. In short, the opponent may be the fossil fuel industry, but the target is the public.

It’s a testament to the divestment movement’s strength that it has managed to produce such a dramatic response from the industry. Hopefully, it won’t be the last. With 450 events having taken place in 60 countries last Friday and Saturday for Global Divestment Day, the movement is already proving itself as full of skilled organizers.

At the University of Mary Washington in Fredricksberg, VA., students followed a hundreds-strong statewide march for divestment with a weekend-long conference, Virginia Power Shift. Divestment organizers in Toronto held an action in the country’s stock exchange, just as 62% of faculty at the University of British Columbia voted to divest.

With more than 30 students sitting in at Harvard, Global Divestment Day was not simply two days of action, but a statement of intent: divest now, or suffer the consequences of standing on the wrong side of history and public opinion.

The challenge now for campaigners is to “polarize, polarize, polarize” – and come out on top.

 


 

Kate Aronoff is an organizer and freelance journalist based in Philadelphia, PA. While in school, she worked extensively with the fossil fuel divestment movement on the local and national level, co-founding Swarthmore Mountain Justice and the Fossil Fuel Divestment Student Network (DSN). She is currently working to build a student power network across Pennsylvania. Follow her on Twitter @katearonoff

This article was originally published by Waging Nonviolence.

 

 




390347

Coal’s dark cloud hangs over Germany’s energy revolution Updated for 2026





The energy market in Germany saw a spectacular change last year as renewable energy became the major source of its electricity supply – leaving lignite, coal and nuclear behind.

Wind, solar, hydropower and biomass reached a new record, producing 27.3% (157bn kilowatt hours) of Germany’s total electricity – and overtaking lignite (156bn kWh) – according to AGEB, a joint association of energy companies and research institutes.

This was an achievement that many energy experts could not have imagined just a few years ago.

Beyond that, Germany’s primary energy consumption – which includes the energy used in power generation, heating and transport – fell to its lowest level since reunification with East Germany in 1990, AGEB report: it shrank by 4.8% compared with 2013.

Estimates by AGEB indicate that Germany’s CO2 emissions will have fallen in 2014 by around 5% compared with 2013, as consumption of all fossil fuels fell and the contribution from renewables rose. Half the CO2 savings came from power generation.

Germany’s use of hard coal (aka black coal) was 7.9% lower in electricity generation than in 2013, while the use of the more carbon-polluting lignite (aka brown coal) fell 2.3%. The share of fossil fuels in the overall energy mix fell from 81.9% in 2013 to 80.8%.

Success? Yes, but …

At first sight, that looks like a big success story. But it comes after several years of rising emissions that have cast doubt on the ‘Energiewende’ – the ambitious German energy transition plan for a simultaneous phase-out of nuclear power and a move to a carbon-free economy.

And researchers calculate that – after allowing for the mild winter of 2014 – the cut in fossil fuel use in energy production meant CO2 emissions fell by only 1%.

In July 2014, a group of NGOs published a study on the EU’s 30 worst CO2-emitting thermal power plants. German power stations featured six times among the 10 dirtiest.

Never heard of Neurath, Niederausssem, Jänschwalde, Boxberg, Weisweiler and Lippendorf? These are the sites of Germany’s lignite-powered stations, which together emit more than 140 megatonnes of CO2 annually – making Germany Europe’s worst coal polluter, followed by Poland and the UK.

And while all of Germany’s remaining nine nuclear power plants must by law be shut down no later than the end of 2022, there is no such legally-binding phase-out for the coal industry. So no one can tell how long Germany will go on burning the worst climate change contributors, lignite and hard coal.

How can Germany meet its emissions targets?

Germany has one of the most ambitious climate targets worldwide: by 2020, its CO2 emissions are due to be 40% below their 1990 level, a cut of nearly 80 million tonnes. But how can it achieve this?

The latest Climate Protection Action Plan, adopted by the German Cabinet on 3 December last year, says that 22 million tonnes of CO2 will be saved “by further measures, especially in the power sector”. Which is great – but well short of the target 80 million tonnes.

Does that mean less power from coal? The Greens pointed out that a coal-fired power plant such as Jänschwalde alone produces more than 22 million tonnes of CO2 – and Jänschwalde is not even the biggest German polluter.

So, right now, the Energiewende seems a story both of success and of failure. Mojib Latif, the German meteorologist and oceanographer who co-authored the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, says:

“The only way of countering the rise in CO2 is to expand renewables. The technology is there – it just has to be used. My most urgent wish for the energy future is that Germany must stop using coal. Otherwise we have no chance of achieving our climate targets.”

 


 

Henner Weithöner is a Berlin-based freelance journalist specialising in renewable energy and climate change. He is also a tutor for advanced journalism training, focusing on environmental reporting and online journalism, especially in developing countries. LinkedIn: de.linkedin.com/pub/henner-weithöner/48/5/151/; Twitter: @weithoener

This article is an edited version of one first published by Climate News Network.

 




389290

Seven ways the Government is pushing up our energy bills Updated for 2026





Household energy bills are in the spotlight again ahead of the general election in May.

A recent report showed that more than a million Britons in work can’t afford to heat their homes. Meanwhile a drop in wholesale energy costs led the government to tell the Big Six to cut consumer’s bills.

Ed Miliband has also called for Ofgem, the energy regulator (which is already investigating the Big Six), to have powers to force energy firms to reduce their tariffs to reflect wholesale prices.

E.On took the lead this week by saying it will reduce its standard gas charge by 3.5% with immediate effect, while one analyst, Emily Gosden, tweeted that British Gas stands to massively profit from the situation:

“If British Gas fails to cut energy prices despite falling costs, its profits for 2015 could soar by 60%, analyst Lakis Athanasiou estimates.”

So, to what extent could coalition Government policies contribute to high energy bills?

Paying out to big players

One of the themes of cross-party discussions on energy has been the importance of stimulating competition.

Yet in practice the coalition’s complex series of reforms to the power market have tended to reduce competition and increase Government price-setting and largesse – largely not for the new players, but for the existing power players.

There are two main mechanisms that are problematic in this respect: the capacity market and Contracts for Difference.

1. Capacity market windfall. The capacity market has paid quite a lot of large electricity suppliers for keeping their generating stations going when that’s what they were planning to do anyway.

In particular old nuclear stations were almost certainly going to carry on as long as they could. But they’re now being paid to do so as well.

Meanwhile, coal stations are the biggest problem for the climate, and getting coal out of the power system is widely agreed to be (at least on the supply end of the power equation) the cheapest way of improving our environmental performance.

But over this Parliament they have started generating much more of our power than before – despite the Government calling for a stop to overseas coal finance at international climate talks, saying no to new coal without CCS, and enacting an Emissions Performance Standard for new coal.

The Capacity Market is now going to pay them to keep UK coal plants open, whilst the Carbon Floor Price is taxing them to close them down. Consumers lose both ways. I unusually find myself agreeing with Head of Centrica Sam Laidlaw on the “inherent paradox” in this situation.

2. Contracts for Difference supporting big energy firms – and Hinkley: The Contract for Difference (CfD) support mechanism really suits big players, who can keep out the smaller players and so maintain the existing system that has been responsible for the prices we see.

There is considerable complexity, little transparency over contract allocation, and considerable risk in investing for energy development upfront – a situation where the risks are best dealt with by large players with legal and public affairs teams.

Despite setting itself against consumer subsidies for nuclear power in the Coalition Agreement, the proposed new power station at Hinkley Point will have many implicit subsidies under CfD, such as grid connection, accident insurance, and repayment risks covered by Government.

Despite this, its index-linked headline cost of power will still be higher than onshore wind, and probably ground-based solar well before it gets built. If it ever does.

Failing to help citizens lower their bills

The best way for consumers of energy to lower their bills is to use less. Not by shivering in the dark but by using the gas, electricity and heating fuel more efficiently. This is not only a social good but should cut emissions too. How well have the coalition done in encouraging energy savings?

3. Green Deal ‘disappointing’: The Green Deal – the Government’s flagship project for efficiency – has been a disappointing failure according to Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, with poor planning, communications and implementation.

4. ECO cut: Another scheme, the only publicly funded source of energy efficiency work on homes, called ‘ECO’ was cut in a move that PM Cameron alledgedly said constituted “cutting the green crap”.

This happened when the Government were on the back-foot politically after Ed Miliband pledged to freeze consumer energy prices.

This meant a considerable loss of momentum on efficiency installation – and so higher bills for consumers in the longer-term – and a windfall of around £245 million for energy suppliers, according to analysis by Association for the Conservation of Energy.

5. EU efficiency target blocked: The UK has also been highly obstructive in seeking agreement on a new EU wide target that would provide the certainty for a new round of efficiency gains. Much of the momentum for energy efficiency – and thus for lower bills – comes from EU targets and initiatives (don’t tell UKIP).

Examples include the product standards which provide savings of over £100 on the average bill (see chart 11).

Keeping the UK system stuck in the past

Not acknowledging the economic and security threat of climate change means not thinking ahead to a new way of doing energy. The future will not look like the past. There will be cheaper and better ways of getting energy services, unless UK policy locks us into the old way of doing things.

6. Blocking wind and solar: The cheapest forms of low carbon power will soon be onshore wind and solar. Senior members of the Government are blocking wind and undermining solar, despite David Cameron hailing Britain’s renewable power success at Ban Ki Moon’s summit last year:

“We’ve more than doubled our capacity in renewable electricity in the last 4 years alone. We now have enough solar to power almost a million UK homes.”

7. Decentralised energy: The coalition’s Green Investment Bank has recently announced £200m of funding for community energy schemes, but it is not fulfilling its full potential.

The GIB could do a lot more if it was given fully-fledged borrowing powers or if it was expanded into a broader state investor similar to green investment structures like Germany and France.

A number of major banks are now arguing that the future will be a decentralised smart grid. UBS are the largest private bank in the world and are advising that large-scale power stations (such as the ones supported by the capacity market and nuclear CfDs) will be rendered redundant.

Similar warnings about the rise of decentralised systems have come from Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Barclays and other private banks advising investors on value for money.

 


 

Dr Doug Parr is Greenpeace UK’s chief scientist.

This article was originally published on the Greenpeace Energydesk.

 




389111

Climate sceptic Lord Ridley – Britain’s biggest carbon footprint? Updated for 2026





Lord Ridley is a powerhouse of climate denial in Britain – and a leading contender for the title of Britain’s biggest individual carbon polluter.

The self-styled Rational Optimist is an advisor to Lord Lawson’s secretly funded charity, the Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF), and acts as a one-man think tank to his brother-in-law, the sacked environment secretary Owen Paterson.

At the same time, the landed aristocrat will mine more than 10 million tonnes of coal from open cast mines scattered around his expansive Blagdon Estate in Northumberland during the next five years.

Miles King, a conservationist with almost 30 years of professional experience, has used publicly available information to estimate that the coal mined from Ridley’s estate will produce 28.6 million tonnes of CO2.

The government has estimated that the UK emitted a total of 570 million tonnes of CO2 or equivalent greenhouse gasses during 2013. This means Ridley’s mines will contribute an estimated 1% of the total annual emissions of a country of 60 million people.

Massive profit, in praise of coal

“I don’t know how much profit Ridley is making from his coal but it must be massive”, King writes on A New Nature Blog. “As the modern day King Coal, one might suggest Matt Ridley has an extremely large vested interest in stoking climate denial.”

Ridley declares an interest in coal when speaking in the House of Lords. He denies being a climate denier, and denies the charge of promoting the coal industry. He claims his arguments support gas rather than coal interests.

However, as King points out, Ridley has been known to defend coal. “It’s the fashion these days to vilify coal as the root of all environmental evil, but I think that’s mistaken”, Ridley writes on his own blog.

“Coal and the technologies it spawned made it possible to double human lifespan, end famine, provide electric light and spare forests for nature.

“Because we get coal out of the ground, we do not have to cut down forests; because we use petroleum we don’t have to kill whales for their oil; because we use gas to make fertilizer we don’t have to cultivate so much land to feed the world.

“This country can compete with China on the basis of either cheap labour or cheap energy. I know which I’d prefer.”

Matt Ridley was also the chairman of the Northern Rock bank from 2004 until its collapse in 2007, after which it was nationalised. In 2013 he was elected as hereditary peer in the House of Lords as a member of the Conservative Party.

Financial benefit unknown – estimated at £13m / year

King’s investigation into Ridley’s carbon footprint was inspired by reports launched by DeSmog UK just before the New Year where we claimed that the mines around the aristocrat’s estate would yield a further £13m a year due to recent planning approvals.

Ridley has so far refused to confirm the exact amount of money he is making from the coal under his family’s land, citing commercial confidentiality. “I receive no financial benefit other than a wayleave in exchange for providing access to the land”, he told DeSmog UK.

The Ridley mines are operated by family firm Banks Mining. The coal under the ground is still owned by the British government following nationalisation in 1947, although the Coal Authority charges very little for the extraction and sale of our most valuable and dangerous resource.

Yet, soon Ridley, his miners and the government could be mandated to reveal exactly how much in profits is being made by the Blagdon mines, how much is paid in taxation, and the amount in fees going to the Coal Authority.

The controversial Infrastructure Bill currently going through Parliament will, if passed, make the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) legally binding.

According to the government, “EITI is a global standard ensuring openness and accountability in the management of revenue from natural resources including coal, oil, natural gas, quarrying and mining.”

Unburnable coal

The transparency initiative was launched by campaigners concerned about the relationship between major oil companies and corrupt governments around the world.

They believe transparency will allow citizens to fully appreciate how national resources are being sold cheaply by their political elites.

But Britain’s support for this initiative could have serious implications for Ridley, when local residents find out exactly how much is being made in profits from the coal on his estate and can test the veracity of his claim to only receive a negligible amount in fees.

A study by academics at University College London (UCL) published in Nature confirms that 80% of the world’s coal is ‘unburnable’ if there is to be any hope of keeping climate change to less than two degrees – and averting catastrophe.

Dr Christophe McGlade, from the UCL Institute for Sustainable Resources, said: “Policymakers must realise that their instincts to completely use the fossil fuels within their countries are wholly incompatible with their commitments to the 2C goal.”

 


 

Brendan Montague writes for DeSmogUK. Follow him on Twitter @Brendanmontague.

This article was originally published on DeSmogUK.

 




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UK’s €46 billion bid for EIB nuclear loan Updated for 2026





The EU’s new infrastructure plan could include €46 billion in debt finance from the European Investment Bank (EIB) for UK nuclear power projects, according to an analysis of newly published documents by international NGO, CEE Bankwatch Network.

Also in line for support are huge new coal mines and coal power stations in Poland and eastern Europe, and upgrades to existing highly polluting coal plants that would otherwise be forced to close.

The documents just presented by the European Commission, include details of infrastructure projects bidding for support from the €300bn plan within each member state.

It comes as EU negotiators are in Lima arguing for tougher global climate targets.

The EU infrastructure plan will use around €21bn from the EU’s budget and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to provide guarantees to projects considered to be strategic investments in European infrastructure – creating a new funding body to work alongside the EIB.

The EIB will then seek to raise further €60bn to invest in unfunded projects across Europe.

UK – nuclear, biomass, coal gasification

The largest chunk of infrastructure money in the UK’s list is the €46bn it is seeking from the EIB for new nuclear power stations which have been hit by “funding shortages due to lack of support from utilities and private investors” – €16bn of it in 2015.

Three potential projects are listed with a total capacity of 12.2GW: Hinkley Point C, Wylfa, and Moorside, all described as “reaching investment decision in the near term.” The document adds that “more support is needed to unlock capital and accelerate investment.”

It adds that there are “barriers” to investment: “High construction cost, long payback period is making debt raising difficult.” The UK’s solution: “EIB senior and sub-ordinated debt or guarantees for developers and supply chain”.

The UK’s plans also include €6.3bn in support for new biomass combustion plants to meet the UK’s 2020 renewable energy targets which face “lack of investment appetite” in part due to “concerns over the sustainability of biomass.”

Under the environment section of its pitch the UK lists support for controversial offshore underground coal gasification with carbon capture claiming: “this project can attract commercial investment if backed by loan guarantees but needs £23m up front in 2015 for pre-commercial testing.”

Poland’s bid for nuclear and massive coal expansion

Poland’s bid for support includes plans for a €5 billion new lignite (brown coal) mine and power plant in Gubin and €1.5bn each for giant hard coal plants in Laziska and Kozienice hard coal power plants already under construction.

Further to that Poland is seeking EU funds to modernise its ageing fleet of existing coal-fired plants which would otherwise be forced to close under EU air quality rules.

Polish coal projects have struggled to attract investment due to the high cost of mining and concerns amongst investors that Europe’s own plans to cut emissions by 40% are incompatible with expansion of the Polish coal sector.

But the biggest energy sector funding item is €12bn for an unnamed nuclear power plant. “The implementation of the project is impeded by a number of barriers and failures”, the bid makes clear, including “lack of market incentives”, “market failures linked to the lack of long-term economic predictability” and “regulatory barriers linked to highly restrictive licencing requirements”.

The EIB – which has previously committed not to finance coal plants – welcomed the list of projects, which amounts to a total of over a trillion euros, despite Poland’s bid for huge coal sector expansion.

“It is also urgent to tackle the significant non-financial barriers identified by the Task Force that prevent investment for viable projects from materialising”, insisted EIB president Werner Hoyer.

‘Environmental organisations to be managed’

Referring to Poland’s Gubin project the leaked document notes: “There is high risk that without appropriate support mechanisms, financial closure and investment implementation may not be feasible. Numerous stakeholders (especially environmental organizations) to [be] managed.”

The support for UK nuclear and Polish coal appear to be at odds with EU plans to focus investment on projects which are economically viable and deliverable in the short term.

The list was put together by an EU task force including the European commission, member states, the EIB and industry representatives – there were no representatives from civil society.

The list of projects is to be further discussed – and reduced – by the European Council, Commission and the European Investment Bank and no final decisions have been made yet.

“Scary is the first word that came to my mind as I looked at the list of projects proposed by the various member states to be financed from Juncker’s billions,” commented Bankwatch’s Markus Trilling.

“There is a huge amount of coal being proposed by the various countries, including Poland, Croatia and Romania, and this is in full contradiction not only to EU goals but also to Juncker’s rhetoric on sustainability.”

Xavier Sol of Counter Balance added: “As guarantors of the good use of public funds, the EC and the EIB have to help Europeans escape this madness of bad and dirty infrastructure and make sure transformative sectors such as energy efficiency and renewables get priority over fossil fuels.

The EU institutions have to check properly every single project and make sure the public has a chance to comment on the list of projects that will get priority financing.”

 


 

This article is an extended and edited version of one originally published on the Greenpeace Energy Desk.

 




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