Tag Archives: green

Death by landfill – cutting ‘green tape’ costs lives Updated for 2026





I’ve been a professional ‘environmental investigator’ for over 22 years now. Over that time I’ve seen some awful offences against the environment. I’ve also witnessed some inspiring action from the individuals and communities affected.

After seeing so many outrageous cases it’s easy to become desensitised to the more everyday environmental offences – even if they are, of themselves, dire to those involved.

But every now and again you come across something that jerks you back to stark reality – something that touches a raw nerve.

I spent the 1990s working as an ‘eco-troubleshooter for hire’ across Britain. For the last decade or so, tired of seeing the same problems coming around again and again, I’ve become more strategic – trying, proactively, to deal with issues before they become an offence to human health and environment. For example, I was apparently the first person touring the UK talking about fracking in 2009 / 2010.

I’ve seen all sorts of ‘nastiness’ – from the dodgy waste reclamation plants of the Black Country, to the chemical plants of Teeside, to the landfills of South Wales.

The point at which I decided to stop chasing tipper lorries, and instead proactively identify ‘the next big issue’, was after fighting Newcastle City Council in 1999/2000.

They had, as a method of ‘recycling’, dumped highly toxic incinerator ash on public parks and allotments across Newcastle – only for them to get a slap on the wrist in the court and, politically, to brush the matter under the carpet.

A case from the ‘book of horrors’

1991-2003 is a time in my career which I look back upon with both fond and troubling memories. And a few weeks ago it came back to haunt me with a vengeance. After speaking about fracking in Guildford I met a couple whose case was right out of my old ‘book of horrors’ from the 1990s.

During February of this year the news was dominated by the flooding along the Thames Valley. Amidst the general mayhem there was one tragedy which has received little public attention.

In the early hours of 8th February 2014, Kye Gbangbola, his seven year old son Zane, and Zane’s mother Nicole were all taken ill at their home in Thameside, Surrey. An ambulance was called and they were taken to hospital. Both Kye and Zane had suffered cardiac arrest. Zane died later in hospital. Kye remains paralysed from the waist down.

Kye and Nicole came to my talk in Guildford and told me of their campaign to find the truth of what happened that day. Surrey Fire and Rescue Service attended and found hydrogen cyanide. Medical tests also showed the presence of cyanide in the family’s blood.

Ten months later the case has not been resolved: no date for an inquest; no death certificate; no resolution to the family’s plight.

What is the possible source of cyanide from flooding?

Just to the north of their home was a former gravel pit which, some years ago, had been used as a waste dump. Before waste licensing came in a the end of the 1970s, waste dumping was pretty much uncontrolled. Former gravel and brick pits around the periphery of London were used extensively to get rid of the capital’s waste.

And the source of the waste? No one knows. If, for example, the site had been filled with innocently identified ‘construction waste’, and if that material had come from a former gasworks in London or elsewhere, it could contain high levels of cyanide.

These things happened in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in 1992 I discovered the the UK Atomic Energy Authority’s Harwell Laboratory, Britain’s premier nuclear research agency, had for years been secretly dumping waste chemical flasks and radioactive waste transport containers in a gravel pit on the edge of an Oxfordshire village.

In April 2014 Surrey County Council, the waste disposal authority for the area, denied that the site had been landfilled. If you go to the Environment Agency’s web site, you can see that the site is classed as an ‘historic landfill’ – that is, pre-dating the controls brought in during the late 1970s.

As flood-waters rose in February, the landfilled material is presumed to have become saturated. As the result of either chemical reactions, or the displacement of toxic gases, or both, the groundwater which filled the cellar is presumed to have carried the toxic gas into the house, overcoming the family.

A trip down eco-memory lane

What I’ve found so troubling about this case is that, for twenty years, this has been a tragedy waiting to happen. To explain why, I need you to take a trip down eco-memory lane.

When I started work professionally in 1992, the first thing I did was to write a series of reports on the issue of contaminated land. During my ‘voluntary period’ (1984-1991) I’d come across the issue a number of times.

From closed landfill sites, to old gasworks, it was a serious problem – and one which I believed could form the basis of a viable business as a full-time ‘environmental investigator’.

The Department of the Environments’ (DoE) Interdepartmental Committee on the Redevelopment of Contaminated Land (ICRCL) had produced a number of documents in the early 1980’s setting out the best practice for the redeveloping contaminated land.

In 1985 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s Eleventh Report highlighted the problems too. This led to research being commissioned, and eventually the issuing of a DoE / Welsh Office circular explaining the procedures and best practice in the redevelopment of contaminated land. The ICRCL also revised some of their previous notes to reflect this.

In 1989 the Government decided to put all this new research and best practice into a formal, legally enforcible regulatory framework; which was inserted into the new Environmental Protection Bill , eventually becoming Part II of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.

Then the development industry went absolutely berserk!

Shortly after the new Act was approved, developers and landowners, fearful that their assets would be effectively worthless if they had to clean up historic contamination, brought brickbats to bear on politicians and regulators. What particularly stirred their wrath were two specific sections of the new Act:

Section 61, which required local waste regulation authorities to map all the former landfill sites in their area. The rationale was that what is the value of bringing new regulations to control the hazard from current and new landfill sites if you didn’t police the condition of the old ones too. Specifically paragraph 1 stated,

“it shall be the duty of every waste regulation authority to cause its area to be inspected from time to time to detect whether any land is in such a condition, by reason of the relevant matters affecting the land, that it may cause pollution of the environment or harm to human health.”

Section 143 was similar, but it extended the need to survey and evaluate land to all potentially “contaminative uses of land”, and created a,

“duty of a local authority, as respects land in its area subject to contamination, to maintain, in accordance with the regulations, a register in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars.”

The fear expressed by many property developers was that large areas of land would be ‘blighted’. The land would be worthless because of the perceived risk in the mind of the public, and because of the large costs of decontamination before any new developments could be built.

That view ignores the potential hazards of development – and arguably the greater cost to public health and the NHS. I’d carried out some research on behalf of Friends of the Earth in Oxfordshire, Kent and Lancashire, and there were a large number of sites which could cause problems to the environment and human health if badly redeveloped.

The risk was not from the land as it was – it was the impact on workers and the public if the substances locked-up in the ground were disturbed, dug up or moved.

In May 1991, following a public consultation, regulations were drafted to implement the new system – to be commenced in April 1992. These were abandoned shortly before this date due to pressure from property developers.

To address the developer’s concerns, following a second consultation period, the regulations were the redrafted – the new guidelines only covering 15% of the land area which the original regulations would have. Despite this, the Department of the Environment still received objections from major developers and landowners.

The Government caves in to pressure

On 24th March 1993 the Government abandoned plans to implement sections 143 and 61 of the Act, and announced that it would begin a review of the powers of regulatory bodies to control the pollution of land.

The exact nature of pressure brought to bear on the Conservative government, causing them to cave into the development lobby rather than protecting public health, was not clear at the time. All we can do today is ask the minister responsible for that decision, Michael Howard – now a member of the House of Lords.

By 1995 the Government was planning to merge various environmental regulators to form a new ‘super-regulator’, the Environment Agency.

That was brought about by The Environment Act 1995. Section 57 of that Act repealed section 143 of the 1990 Act, inserting in its place a new ‘Part IIA’ of the Environmental Protection Act which instituted a new legal framework for dealing with contaminated land.

Section 120 and Schedule 22 of the 1995 Act repealed section 61 of the 1990 Act, taking away the obligation to monitor former landfill sites – meaning that they would be dealt with just like any other types of ‘potentially contaminated land’ even though, arguably, landfill sites are a more hazardous land use.

How can we summarised this new process? That’s best summed up in DEFRA’s 2008 legal definition of land contamination, drawn up by the then ‘New Labour’ government (my emphasis):

“Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 came into force in England in 2000. The Government sees a central aim of the Part 2A regime as being to encourage voluntary remediation of land affected by contamination.”

What does ‘voluntary remediation’ mean in practice?

Around 1997/8 I investigated the redevelopment of the former Royal Small Arms Factory in Enfield Lock. Redevelopment was causing nausea and skin rashes amongst nearby residents.

What that ‘remediation’ meant to the developer of the new Enfield Island Village was that at the least contaminated end of the island, where the ‘expensive’ houses were to be built, a metre or two of soil was dug up (which was causing the problems experienced by the neighbours) and replaced with fresh material before the houses were erected.

At the other, most contaminated end of the island, very little soil was removed. Instead a metre of clay was rolled down on the ground surface before the ‘low cost’ social housing was erected.

This is the problem with the framework for contaminated land instituted in 1995. It proceeds on a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ basis. If the local council doesn’t press the issue, the developer need only undertake works which render the site fit for its intended purpose.

Worse still, if a local authority decides that a site presents an imminent risk to the public, it might have to bear the cost of remedial action and try to bill the landowner for the work. Consequently it isn’t in the interests of local authorities to look, just in case they find something – Surrey’s immediate denial in this case being an exemplar of the principle.

If Section 61 had not been repealed in 1995, Surrey County Council would have had to investigate every former landfill in the area and assess its risk to the public (around the periphery of London, that’s quite a lot of sites).

If Section 147 had not been repealed, Spelthorne Borough Council’s Environmental Health Department would have had to keep a detailed register of potentially contaminated sites, and that register would have been available to anyone to view.

There is a repeating pattern of administrative action at work here

Just as in the early 1990s, today the Government and regulators are coming under pressure to water-down environmental regulations, and ‘cut the green tape‘, to allow business to develop more easily.

For example, on the back of a more right-wing economic bandwagon, instituting policies such as ‘fracking’ for shale gas, David Cameron has instructed his aides to get rid of the green crap from policy.

That’s also why this case touched a raw nerve with me. I’ve come across some nasty cases in the past – such as the Rocket Pool estate in Bradley, Wolverhampton, where people living on the edge of a former landfill were becoming seriously ill (a few years later, a number of local people who I worked with on that case had died).

What really annoys me is that, 20 years ago, the consequences of decisions made then were entirely foreseeable – and were made purely for the sake of money over the value of people’s health.

Today, that same blinkered agenda is still driving decision-making. That’s what hit me as I talked to Kye and Nicole in Guildford. My past was catching up with me and it had so much to say about the present.

We can’t be certain that if sections 61 and 143 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 had not been withdrawn, and the legislation enacted as originally anticipated, that Zane and his family would not have succumbed to the tragedy which befell them in February.

What we can say, especially given the requirements of section 61 on Surrey County Council, is that it would have been less likely to happen if these sites had been properly investigated 20 years ago.

And today, though their individual case is a sad reminder of Britain’s legacy of past mistakes, it should serve as a red flag over decisions taken today to ‘cut green tape’ – which, with what we know from our recent past, could plague present and future generations.

 


 

Paul Mobbs is an independent environmental consultant, investigator, author and lecturer.

A fully referenced version of this article is posted on the Free Range Activism website.

 

 




388382

Death by landfill – cutting ‘green tape’ costs lives Updated for 2026





I’ve been a professional ‘environmental investigator’ for over 22 years now. Over that time I’ve seen some awful offences against the environment. I’ve also witnessed some inspiring action from the individuals and communities affected.

After seeing so many outrageous cases it’s easy to become desensitised to the more everyday environmental offences – even if they are, of themselves, dire to those involved.

But every now and again you come across something that jerks you back to stark reality – something that touches a raw nerve.

I spent the 1990s working as an ‘eco-troubleshooter for hire’ across Britain. For the last decade or so, tired of seeing the same problems coming around again and again, I’ve become more strategic – trying, proactively, to deal with issues before they become an offence to human health and environment. For example, I was apparently the first person touring the UK talking about fracking in 2009 / 2010.

I’ve seen all sorts of ‘nastiness’ – from the dodgy waste reclamation plants of the Black Country, to the chemical plants of Teeside, to the landfills of South Wales.

The point at which I decided to stop chasing tipper lorries, and instead proactively identify ‘the next big issue’, was after fighting Newcastle City Council in 1999/2000.

They had, as a method of ‘recycling’, dumped highly toxic incinerator ash on public parks and allotments across Newcastle – only for them to get a slap on the wrist in the court and, politically, to brush the matter under the carpet.

A case from the ‘book of horrors’

1991-2003 is a time in my career which I look back upon with both fond and troubling memories. And a few weeks ago it came back to haunt me with a vengeance. After speaking about fracking in Guildford I met a couple whose case was right out of my old ‘book of horrors’ from the 1990s.

During February of this year the news was dominated by the flooding along the Thames Valley. Amidst the general mayhem there was one tragedy which has received little public attention.

In the early hours of 8th February 2014, Kye Gbangbola, his seven year old son Zane, and Zane’s mother Nicole were all taken ill at their home in Thameside, Surrey. An ambulance was called and they were taken to hospital. Both Kye and Zane had suffered cardiac arrest. Zane died later in hospital. Kye remains paralysed from the waist down.

Kye and Nicole came to my talk in Guildford and told me of their campaign to find the truth of what happened that day. Surrey Fire and Rescue Service attended and found hydrogen cyanide. Medical tests also showed the presence of cyanide in the family’s blood.

Ten months later the case has not been resolved: no date for an inquest; no death certificate; no resolution to the family’s plight.

What is the possible source of cyanide from flooding?

Just to the north of their home was a former gravel pit which, some years ago, had been used as a waste dump. Before waste licensing came in a the end of the 1970s, waste dumping was pretty much uncontrolled. Former gravel and brick pits around the periphery of London were used extensively to get rid of the capital’s waste.

And the source of the waste? No one knows. If, for example, the site had been filled with innocently identified ‘construction waste’, and if that material had come from a former gasworks in London or elsewhere, it could contain high levels of cyanide.

These things happened in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in 1992 I discovered the the UK Atomic Energy Authority’s Harwell Laboratory, Britain’s premier nuclear research agency, had for years been secretly dumping waste chemical flasks and radioactive waste transport containers in a gravel pit on the edge of an Oxfordshire village.

In April 2014 Surrey County Council, the waste disposal authority for the area, denied that the site had been landfilled. If you go to the Environment Agency’s web site, you can see that the site is classed as an ‘historic landfill’ – that is, pre-dating the controls brought in during the late 1970s.

As flood-waters rose in February, the landfilled material is presumed to have become saturated. As the result of either chemical reactions, or the displacement of toxic gases, or both, the groundwater which filled the cellar is presumed to have carried the toxic gas into the house, overcoming the family.

A trip down eco-memory lane

What I’ve found so troubling about this case is that, for twenty years, this has been a tragedy waiting to happen. To explain why, I need you to take a trip down eco-memory lane.

When I started work professionally in 1992, the first thing I did was to write a series of reports on the issue of contaminated land. During my ‘voluntary period’ (1984-1991) I’d come across the issue a number of times.

From closed landfill sites, to old gasworks, it was a serious problem – and one which I believed could form the basis of a viable business as a full-time ‘environmental investigator’.

The Department of the Environments’ (DoE) Interdepartmental Committee on the Redevelopment of Contaminated Land (ICRCL) had produced a number of documents in the early 1980’s setting out the best practice for the redeveloping contaminated land.

In 1985 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s Eleventh Report highlighted the problems too. This led to research being commissioned, and eventually the issuing of a DoE / Welsh Office circular explaining the procedures and best practice in the redevelopment of contaminated land. The ICRCL also revised some of their previous notes to reflect this.

In 1989 the Government decided to put all this new research and best practice into a formal, legally enforcible regulatory framework; which was inserted into the new Environmental Protection Bill , eventually becoming Part II of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.

Then the development industry went absolutely berserk!

Shortly after the new Act was approved, developers and landowners, fearful that their assets would be effectively worthless if they had to clean up historic contamination, brought brickbats to bear on politicians and regulators. What particularly stirred their wrath were two specific sections of the new Act:

Section 61, which required local waste regulation authorities to map all the former landfill sites in their area. The rationale was that what is the value of bringing new regulations to control the hazard from current and new landfill sites if you didn’t police the condition of the old ones too. Specifically paragraph 1 stated,

“it shall be the duty of every waste regulation authority to cause its area to be inspected from time to time to detect whether any land is in such a condition, by reason of the relevant matters affecting the land, that it may cause pollution of the environment or harm to human health.”

Section 143 was similar, but it extended the need to survey and evaluate land to all potentially “contaminative uses of land”, and created a,

“duty of a local authority, as respects land in its area subject to contamination, to maintain, in accordance with the regulations, a register in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars.”

The fear expressed by many property developers was that large areas of land would be ‘blighted’. The land would be worthless because of the perceived risk in the mind of the public, and because of the large costs of decontamination before any new developments could be built.

That view ignores the potential hazards of development – and arguably the greater cost to public health and the NHS. I’d carried out some research on behalf of Friends of the Earth in Oxfordshire, Kent and Lancashire, and there were a large number of sites which could cause problems to the environment and human health if badly redeveloped.

The risk was not from the land as it was – it was the impact on workers and the public if the substances locked-up in the ground were disturbed, dug up or moved.

In May 1991, following a public consultation, regulations were drafted to implement the new system – to be commenced in April 1992. These were abandoned shortly before this date due to pressure from property developers.

To address the developer’s concerns, following a second consultation period, the regulations were the redrafted – the new guidelines only covering 15% of the land area which the original regulations would have. Despite this, the Department of the Environment still received objections from major developers and landowners.

The Government caves in to pressure

On 24th March 1993 the Government abandoned plans to implement sections 143 and 61 of the Act, and announced that it would begin a review of the powers of regulatory bodies to control the pollution of land.

The exact nature of pressure brought to bear on the Conservative government, causing them to cave into the development lobby rather than protecting public health, was not clear at the time. All we can do today is ask the minister responsible for that decision, Michael Howard – now a member of the House of Lords.

By 1995 the Government was planning to merge various environmental regulators to form a new ‘super-regulator’, the Environment Agency.

That was brought about by The Environment Act 1995. Section 57 of that Act repealed section 143 of the 1990 Act, inserting in its place a new ‘Part IIA’ of the Environmental Protection Act which instituted a new legal framework for dealing with contaminated land.

Section 120 and Schedule 22 of the 1995 Act repealed section 61 of the 1990 Act, taking away the obligation to monitor former landfill sites – meaning that they would be dealt with just like any other types of ‘potentially contaminated land’ even though, arguably, landfill sites are a more hazardous land use.

How can we summarised this new process? That’s best summed up in DEFRA’s 2008 legal definition of land contamination, drawn up by the then ‘New Labour’ government (my emphasis):

“Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 came into force in England in 2000. The Government sees a central aim of the Part 2A regime as being to encourage voluntary remediation of land affected by contamination.”

What does ‘voluntary remediation’ mean in practice?

Around 1997/8 I investigated the redevelopment of the former Royal Small Arms Factory in Enfield Lock. Redevelopment was causing nausea and skin rashes amongst nearby residents.

What that ‘remediation’ meant to the developer of the new Enfield Island Village was that at the least contaminated end of the island, where the ‘expensive’ houses were to be built, a metre or two of soil was dug up (which was causing the problems experienced by the neighbours) and replaced with fresh material before the houses were erected.

At the other, most contaminated end of the island, very little soil was removed. Instead a metre of clay was rolled down on the ground surface before the ‘low cost’ social housing was erected.

This is the problem with the framework for contaminated land instituted in 1995. It proceeds on a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ basis. If the local council doesn’t press the issue, the developer need only undertake works which render the site fit for its intended purpose.

Worse still, if a local authority decides that a site presents an imminent risk to the public, it might have to bear the cost of remedial action and try to bill the landowner for the work. Consequently it isn’t in the interests of local authorities to look, just in case they find something – Surrey’s immediate denial in this case being an exemplar of the principle.

If Section 61 had not been repealed in 1995, Surrey County Council would have had to investigate every former landfill in the area and assess its risk to the public (around the periphery of London, that’s quite a lot of sites).

If Section 147 had not been repealed, Spelthorne Borough Council’s Environmental Health Department would have had to keep a detailed register of potentially contaminated sites, and that register would have been available to anyone to view.

There is a repeating pattern of administrative action at work here

Just as in the early 1990s, today the Government and regulators are coming under pressure to water-down environmental regulations, and ‘cut the green tape‘, to allow business to develop more easily.

For example, on the back of a more right-wing economic bandwagon, instituting policies such as ‘fracking’ for shale gas, David Cameron has instructed his aides to get rid of the green crap from policy.

That’s also why this case touched a raw nerve with me. I’ve come across some nasty cases in the past – such as the Rocket Pool estate in Bradley, Wolverhampton, where people living on the edge of a former landfill were becoming seriously ill (a few years later, a number of local people who I worked with on that case had died).

What really annoys me is that, 20 years ago, the consequences of decisions made then were entirely foreseeable – and were made purely for the sake of money over the value of people’s health.

Today, that same blinkered agenda is still driving decision-making. That’s what hit me as I talked to Kye and Nicole in Guildford. My past was catching up with me and it had so much to say about the present.

We can’t be certain that if sections 61 and 143 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 had not been withdrawn, and the legislation enacted as originally anticipated, that Zane and his family would not have succumbed to the tragedy which befell them in February.

What we can say, especially given the requirements of section 61 on Surrey County Council, is that it would have been less likely to happen if these sites had been properly investigated 20 years ago.

And today, though their individual case is a sad reminder of Britain’s legacy of past mistakes, it should serve as a red flag over decisions taken today to ‘cut green tape’ – which, with what we know from our recent past, could plague present and future generations.

 


 

Paul Mobbs is an independent environmental consultant, investigator, author and lecturer.

A fully referenced version of this article is posted on the Free Range Activism website.

 

 




388382

Europe on the brink – green future or industrial wasteland? Updated for 2026





In the UK’s debate over its future membership of the EU, the broad ‘progressive’ spectrum of voters has long been in the pro-EU camp.

That’s not because ‘we’ like everything about the EU. It’s because the EU has offered unmistakable benefits for people and the environment – from the Working Time Directive, limiting the hours employees may be forced to work, to the Habitats & Species Directive, protecting our most precious wildlife, and the Air Quality Directive, which is forcing cuts in atmospheric pollution that are already preventing hundreds of thousands of premature deaths.

There is no doubt that a reluctant UK – once the proverbial ‘dirty man of Europe’ – has been forced to be infinitely cleaner and greener than it would ever have been on its own. The same goes for many other countries. The benefits have been enormous and unmistakeable.

The Dark is Rising

But there is another side to the EU, built as it was on the disreputable foundations of the Coal and Steel Community and the Euratom Treaty. This is a Europe of vested corporate interests, of over-powerful business lobbies, of jealously guarded privilege, secrecy and dodgy back-room political deals, of weak-wristed regulators unwilling or unable to clamp down on corporate abuses.

And today, it is all too clear which aspect of the EU dominates in the Junckers Commission. In the name of “focusing on what truly matters for citizens – jobs, growth and investment” the Commission is reining in desperately needed regulation to give citizens a clean and safe environment.

Proposed laws to reduce the air pollution that’s still killing some 400,000 people a year are to be scrapped – if Junckers and his troglodytic henchman Timmermans get their way in the College of Commissioners next Tuesday.

Under the name of ‘better regulation’ the whole ‘circular economy’ package to reduce waste to landfill and increase recycling would get bunged into the Commission’s capacious paper-shredder.

There have also been powerful calls to make the Habitats and Birds Directives more adaptable to local needs for example to allow Malta to carry on massacring migrating birds. You can be sure that the adaptation would only go one way – to weaken the laws, not to strengthen them.

Nuclear resurgence

The EU has also shown itself to be far too adaptable for its own good in its interpretation of it’s all important ‘state aid’ rules when it comes to nuclear power.

In October the Commission mysteriously approved a support package worth as much as £35 billion for the UK’s proposed Hinkley C nuclear power station – deeming, against a mountain of evidence, that it somehow maintained a ‘level playing field’ in the UK’s power market, even as it decimated the country’s renewable industries.

And now, following the UK’s inability to raise construction finance in spite of astonishingly generous power prices for nuclear power and a £10 billion construction finance guarantee, the Commission has approved three planned UK nuclear power stations (Hinkley Point C, Wylfa, and Moorside) to appear on its 2015 ‘infrastructure plan’ – putting them in line for as much as €46 billion in loan finance led by the European Investment Bank.

In fact the EU support is meant to be strictly reserved for projects that are economically viable and deliverable in the short term – which is clearly the very opposite of the case as regards the UK’s nuclear projects, which may require as much as £100 billion in subsidies and will not be deliverable for well over a decade.

Indeed, the infrastructure plan spells out the problems they face in clear terms, with strong “barriers” to investment. “High construction cost, long payback period is making debt raising difficult”, the document reveals.

The same applies to Poland’s struggling coal industry – also in line for €8 billion of ‘infrastructure’ funds to build new lignite coal mines, new power stations and extend the lifetimes of old coal plants that would otherwise have to be shut down.

Sacrificing democracy on the altar of ‘free trade’

At the same time the Commission is galloping into deeply unpopular trade and investment deals with the USA and Canada known as TTIP and CETA. Negotiations have been taking place in secret, excluding not just civil society but even MEPs and legislators in national member state Parliaments.

Most vexatious are the ‘investor dispute settlement’ procedures that would allow investors to sue national government for losses incurred due to regulatory changes affecting their anticipated profits.

As such, governments could be liable for losses caused by tightening pollution laws, raising the minimum wage, applying tighter limits on the release of environmental toxins, reversing the privatisation of public services, or a host of other actions. The damages would be awarded in secret courts composed of corporate lawyers.

TTIP / CETA would also involve ‘mutual recognition’ of standards between the EU and the USA and Canada, forcing EU consumers to accept North American GMO crops and meat and dairy produce from animals treated with yield-increasing growth hormones, currently banned from EU markets.

Astonishingly, the Commission even refused to accept an offical petition signed by over 1 million EU citizens known as a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) – on the manifestly false grounds that ECIs can only support the Commission’s proposals, and not oppose them.

How much longer can the EU count on our support?

It increasingly appears that the European Commission has decided, in the name of ‘jobs’, ‘investment’, ‘trade’ and ‘prosperity’ to abandon all the core values that once made the EU attractive to liberal and green minded voters, and abandon itself wholesale to the corporate lobbyists that stalk its corridors and enjoy privileged access to its officials.

And when it comes to a referendum on the UK’s continued EU membership,will surely leave progressive voters bereft of any positive enthusiasm to stay in.

Of course, it may be that the UK on its own would pursue even worse social and environmental policies, and that our own clay-footed politicians would be even more ready to sacrifice our rights, liberties and democratic traditions to corporate interests.

But that is to miss the point. To win a close-run election, the most important thing is not to so much win over opponents to your cause, but to get your own vote out on the day.

To get progressives to deliver their pro-EU votes – surely a necessary counterbalance to the now mainstream anti-EU right – we must be offered a positive vision of the Europe we want, and that our children have a right to enjoy.

And that means a green Europe, leading the world in renewable energy technologies, delivering social and environmental benefits to its citizens, founded on a bedrock of social justice, and rebalancing power away from profit-driven corporations, and to the people.

 



Oliver Tickell edits The Ecologist.

 

 




388131

Long noses: Shell, GDF Suez, Samsung sweep Pinocchio Awards Updated for 2026





The grand winners of the Pinocchio Awards 2014 were Shell, GDF Suez and Samsung, announced at a celebrity-studded ceremony in Paris.

This year there were nine nominees for voters to choose between, and a new record was set for the number of votes since the Awards began in 2008: over 61,000 in total.

“This demonstrates citizens’ growing outrage about the severe impact multinational corporations’ activities are having on society and the environment”, commented Friends of the Earth France (FOEF) – which organises the Awards with Peuples Solidaires (ActionAid France) and CRID (Research and Information Centre for Development).

‘Most aggressive’ Shell – a richly deserved distinction

Shell won hands down for the Pinocchio award category ‘One for all and all for me!’, with 43% of the vote, for the development of shale gas projects across the entire world – except in Holland, its home country, which is subject to a fracking moratorium.

This prize is awarded to the company “which has the most aggressive policy in terms of appropriation, exploitation or destruction of natural resources.”

While Shell, like other big oil majors, prides itself on conducting its operations in accordance with “ambitious principles”, the reality observed on the ground, particularly in Argentina and the Ukraine, is quite different.

In these countries, reports FOEF, we see “lack of consultation with the population, wells drilled in a natural protected area and on farmland, toxic well-water reservoirs left out in the open, and lack of financial transparency, to name a few examples.”

Number two in the category with 29% of the vote was the French bank Crédit Agricole, for its financing of Mountain-top removal coal mining in Appalachia, USA – providing finance to Arch Coal and Alpha Natural Resources. Banktrack has published a full dossier on the bank’s activities.

GDF Suez – ‘green bonds’

In the prestigious ‘Greener than green’ category – which rewards the company which has led “the most abusive and misleading communication campaign in regard to its actual activities”, the Pinocchio award was received by GDF Suez with 42% of the vote for its ‘green bonds’, beating EDF and Pur Projet.

Last May, this French energy giant proudly announced that it had issued the biggest “green bond” ever made by a private company, collecting 2.5 billion Euros from private investors to finance its so-called clean energy projects.

However, on closer examination, no clear social or environmental criteria were associated with these ‘green’ bonds, and the company has not published a list of the projects it has financed.

It could even be using this money for destructive projects, such as large dams, like the one in Jirau (Brazil) that the company mentioned as an example. Furthermore, GDF Suez is continuing to invest heavily in fossil fuels.

Running up with a 31% share of the vote was the French parastatal energy giant EDF, recognising its construction of the Kolubara B 750MW coal-fired power station in Serbia – in direct contradiction of its declared “ambition for a diversified and decarbonised energy mix”.

Samsung – ‘dirty hands, full wallet’

Finally, with 40% of the vote, the Pinocchio award for the category ‘Dirty hands, full wallet’ – which honours the company with the most opaque policy at the financial level, in terms of lobbying or in its supply chain – was given to Samsung.

The award reflects the company’s “disgraceful working conditions in its product-manufacturing factories in China: excessive working hours, pitiful wages and child labour, to cite just a few examples.”

Despite repeated inquiries and questioning civil society, as well as the filing of a complaint in France, this technology market-leader persistently denies these accusations.

“The company should face up to reality and implement some practical measures to improve working conditions for Chinese factory workers and put an end to these violations of human rights”, says FOEF.

It was closely followed by French oil company Perenco, with 31%, for its oil drilling in DRC Congo characterised by “the pillage of natural resources, financial opacity, environmental destruction and repression of dissent in local communities.”

A powerful tool in holding corporations to account

By condemning numerous violations against human rights and the environment, the Pinocchio Awards have grown in importance since they were established in 2008, and they help put pressure on companies to make them change their practices.

The scale of the event and its role in the public debate surrounding CSR this year has forced all companies nominated for an award to speak out publicly on the facts that have been reported about them.

Juliette Renaud, Corporate Accountability Campaigner at Friends of the Earth France, says: “Just a year ago we were celebrating the proposal of a bill on the due diligence of multinational companies – but pressure from lobby groups kept the government inactive on the subject, and this law has still not been voted or even discussed in Parliament.

Fanny Gallois, Campaign Manager at Peuples Solidaires, added: “By setting concrete facts against companies’ grand speeches, the Pinocchio Awards are showing this year again that these loopholes are allowing companies to operate with impunity in France and throughout the world.”

 


 

The Pinocchio Awards are organised in a media partnership with Basta!, the Multinational Observatory and Real World Radio, who have published informative articles and interviews on each of the nominees.

More information: Prix Pinocchio.

Oliver Tickell edits The Ecologist.

 




386949

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

China leads the world in green energy – despite US Senate Leader ‘do nothing’ claims Updated for 2026





“As I read the agreement it requires the Chinese to do nothing at all for 16 years while these carbon emissions regulations are creating havoc in my state and around the country.”

So said US Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell on 12th November 2014 as the news of the US-China climate deal were announced.

But far from ‘doing nothing at all’, China will be building the world’s largest renewable energy system over the next 16 years. This is something that China has already started doing – so the targets agreed upon are feasible – if arduous.

As part of the US-China climate deal announced on Wednesday, China is committing to raise the proportion of renewables in its total energy system to 20%. As renewables and nuclear power currently account for 10% of China’s total energy consumption, this implies a doubling of its renewables commitment. The challenge is illustrated in the graph below.

This is why Chinese president Xi Jinping can commit China to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030. In reality, we and many other observers expect China’s carbon emissions to peak well before that date, so there is room for more dramatic announcements to come from the Chinese side.

China’s energy is already on a strong green track

In fact, at the recent APEC meeting in Beijing, China’s national Energy Bureau stated that China’s coal consumption would probably peak by 2020, at about 4.2 billion tonnes per year. So carbon emissions could peak just a little after that – and certainly before 2030.

Mitch McConnell and many other commentators have placed all their emphasis on China’s building of a “black” energy system, comprising new coal and other fossil fuel facilities, while ignoring the enormous commitments already made to renewables and a complementary green energy system.

By our reckoning, the leading edge of change in China’s energy system is already more green than black, and the total system is greening at such a rate that the goals just announced as part of the climate deal should certainly be met.

The White House, in its statement announcing the joint deal, said that for China to meet its commitment

” … it will require China to deploy an additional 800-1000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission generation capacity by 2030 – more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to total current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”

These are enormous numbers, but they fit with China’s current capacity and goals. In 2013 China’s generating capacity from all sources reached 1,247 gigawatts.

Its generating capacity from water, wind and sun (leaving nuclear to one side) has already reached 378 gigawatts, far in front of all other industrial countries (see here).

Aiming to build over 1GW of renewable capacity per week

China’s National Development and Reform Commission has already announced plans to raise that total to 550GW by 2017. This is a commitment to renewables on a colossal scale that dwarfs that of other countries.

This goal would call for an additional 1,000GW of renewable generation capacity to be built over the next 15 years – or 1.33 GW (equivalent to a large nuclear power station) every week.

The difference between the commitments made by China and those by other countries is that China is committing to renewables as part of an industrial strategy to focus its industrial growth around such clean industries and technologies.

As part of the 12th Five year Plan, China has singled out seven strategic industries that it sees as being the pillars of its economy – including electric vehicles, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.

There is likely to be even greener tinge to the 13th Five Year Plan, currently under discussion and due to run from 2016 to 2020.

So far from ‘doing nothing’ over the next 16 years, China is transforming its economy and energy system so that water, wind and solar power will be its driving forces. Other countries – not least close US allies such as Australia and Canada – would be wise to pay attention.

Verdict

False. China has an extensive plan to curtail its emissions between now and 2030, including building renewable energy facilities on a far larger scale than any other nation. Honouring its new climate pact with the United States will involve doing a lot more than nothing.

Review by Frank Jotzo: ‘it’s even better than that!’

The view that China’s announced target is feasible but arduous is correct. It is also true that a peaking of carbon dioxide emissions in China is possible before 2025, given strong Chinese policy efforts and future changes to the rate and nature of China’s economic growth.

China has extensive policies in place to constrain the growth in energy use and to shift away from coal, and under this commitment China will intensify those efforts.

It is important to understand that China’s effort is much broader even than the authors of this FactCheck suggest.

The text correctly points out the importance of renewable energy expansion, but improvements in energy efficiency and the transformation of China’s economic structure towards high-value manufacturing and services will do more to dampen carbon emissions growth.

In my own analysis, my colleagues and I found that a carbon dioxide peak around 2025 would be achieved by maintaining a 4% per year improvement in economy-wide energy productivity, and a 1.0-1.5% annual reduction in the carbon intensity of energy supply.

The former comes through better technical efficiency and structural change, the latter through a shift from coal to gas, renewables and nuclear power.

 


 

John Mathews is Professor of Strategic Management, Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University.

Hao Tan is Senior Lecturer in International Business at the University of Newcastle.

Frank Jotzo (reviewer) is Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy at the Australian National University.

The authors do not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article. They also have no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386873

Germany’s green power surges ahead – at a price that’s finally falling Updated for 2026





Germany is well on its way towards having a predominantly green electricity supply.

The transition from nuclear and fossil-fuel electricity to using renewables is happening faster than anyone had anticipated. This is a success, but there is a downside: it is hugely expensive.

The energy transition is an explicit policy goal in Germany, having been made a priority project by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel.

It has four strands: reducing CO2 emissions, improving energy efficiency, promoting renewable energy and the gradual phase-out of nuclear power.

Nuclear phase-out is actually an old story that started in 2000 when the Schroeder administration first announced a 20-year timetable.

It was a bit of a ‘yes-no’ rollercoaster until the Fukushima incident, after which the decision in favour was final. This is widely supported by the German public, meaning that nuclear power is politically not an option at the moment.

Installed renewable capacity now equals demand

Yet without a doubt, the most significant development within the energy transition project has been the growth of Germany’s renewable energy sources (RES). Chart 1 (right) shows how it has developed in the past few years and where the government expects it to be by 2050.

The horizontal black line depicts the approximate maximum demand at any time, which is about 85GW (this will not change much in the future).

This shows that installed renewable capacity is now already more or less equal to maximum demand. On a very sunny and windy day, renewables are now capable of meeting the demands of the entire country.

But as we all know, the weather is notoriously unreliable and variable. So a secure system needs more renewable capacity and also more reserve capacity from conventional power plants (mainly fuelled by natural gas) to make sure it can always meet demand.

As Chart 1 (above right) indicates, installed renewable capacity in 2050 is expected to be 180GW, which is roughly twice maximum demand. By that time, the target is that 80% of electricity supply will be from renewables (basically this is how much renewable power you need to meet this level of supply on a regular basis).

Great benefits – but also high costs

In common with other countries moving in the same direction, the government has various motives for this big shift. Renewables are carbon-free and rely on no fossil fuels, so they are an essential component of meeting European emissions targets.

The government hopes for positive spin-off effects on exports, innovation and new jobs. And once the investment cost of the transition has been incurred, we would hope that electricity supply is actually quite cheap. After all, sun and wind are free. Germany sees the energy transition as an investment in the future: we pay for the next generation.

The move to renewables has been a success. It has happened at high speed since the late 1990s. The debate is no longer whether it will succeed, but rather what do we do with ‘too much’ renewable power. But behind this positive story, the dark side is the huge expense.

Early in 2013, the then minister of environment Peter Altmaier mentioned the staggering amount of €1 trillion as the potential cost of the overall transition.

This relied on a quick-and-dirty back-of-the-envelope calculation, which raises many questions and was never confirmed, but it does give a feel for the order of magnitude. The end-users – and thus the voters in Germany – are starting to feel the pain.

Since the installation costs mean that renewables currently cost more per unit of power than conventional power, they are subsidised by a surcharge on the electricity price. In other words, electricity end-users directly pay for it.

As you can see from Chart 2 (above right), the surcharge for small end-users has soared since 2009 to cope with the rapid growth of installed capacity (the step-change that year reflected a sudden big rise in solar power, which is particularly expensive).

The total subsidy is currently about €20bn / year, which amounts to €218 / year per household on top of the normal electricity bill. Whether this is still affordable is a key question in the country right now.

Corporate punishment

The energy transition has meanwhile changed the face of the electricity market, with severe consequences for traditional firms like E.ON and RWE. They are suffering badly at the moment and are having to rethink their business models completely.

In short, they face three challenges. The nuclear phase-out means they have to make very significant write-downs on their nuclear plants, at a loss to the shareholders. They are still fighting the government for compensation payments.

Second, renewable power is suppressing electricity wholesale prices – essentially because they are cheaper to run per unit of power, which under the rules for calculating the wholesale price tends to bring them down across the board.

This means that the revenues for conventional power plants are low and no longer cover the investment costs.

Third, conventional power from gas and coal is being pushed out of the market. This means that a lot of conventional power plants are largely standing idle and not making any money.

Since the future business model for such plants is looking bleak, the power companies are sitting on investments which are not going to be profitable. Of course, RWE and E.ON are adjusting their long-term strategies.

Consumer surcharge for 2015 reduced

While this has been going on, the rising costs for residential end-users have become a political problem.

In 2014 the government responded with a reform package, which slows down the energy transition in an attempt to control the costs. Basically the annual growth of new renewables has been capped to a pre-determined level.

This seems to be working. The surcharge for 2015 has been calculated at 6.17 €c / kWh, which is a small decline compared to 2014. Politically, this may well have been a wise policy, as public support for the energy transition was dwindling. It means that green energy development will happen more slowly.

So far the government appears to be standing by the same targets, perhaps because the explosion in development over the past few years had put it on an even faster track.

Whatever happens from here, one thing remains key: without public support, the energy transition will not work.

 


 

Gert Brunekreeft is Adjunct Professor for Energy Economics at Jacobs University Bremen. He does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




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