Tag Archives: development

Land and seed laws under attack as Africa is groomed for corporate recolonization Updated for 2026





A battle is raging for control of resources in Africa – land, water, seeds, minerals, ores, forests, oil, renewable energy sources.

Agriculture is one of the most important theatres of this battle. Governments, corporations, foundations and development agencies are pushing hard to commercialise and industrialise African farming.

Many of the key players are well known. They include the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the G8, the African Union, the Bill Gates-funded ‘Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa’ (AGRA), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the International Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC).

Together they are committed to helping agribusiness become the continent’s primary food commodity producer. To do this, they are not only pouring money into projects to transform farming operations on the ground – they are also changing African laws to accommodate the agribusiness agenda.

Privatising both land and seeds is essential for the corporate model to flourish in Africa. With regard to agricultural land, this means pushing for the official demarcation, registration and titling of farms. It also means making it possible for foreign investors to lease or own farmland on a long-term basis.

With regard to seeds, it means having governments require that seeds be registered in an official catalogue in order to be traded. It also means introducing intellectual property rights over plant varieties and criminalising farmers who ignore them. In all cases, the goal is to turn what has long been a commons into something that corporates can control and profit from.

Lifting the veil of secrecy

This survey aims to provide an overview of just who is pushing for which specific changes in these areas – looking not at the plans and projects, but at the actual texts that will define the new rules.

It was not easy to get information about this. Many phone calls to the World Bank and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) offices went unanswered. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) brushed us off. Even African Union officials did not want to answer questions from – and be accountable to – African citizens doing this inventory.

This made the task of coming up with an accurate, detailed picture of what is going on quite difficult. We did learn a few things, though.

While there is a lot of civil society attention focused on the G8’s New Alliance for Food and Nutrition, there are many more actors doing many similar things across Africa. Our limited review makes it clear that the greatest pressure to change land and seed laws comes from Washington DC – home to the World Bank, USAID and the MCC.

‘Land reform’ is to benefit investors, not farmers

Land certificates – which should be seen as a stepping stone to formal land titles – are being promoted as an appropriate way to ‘securitise’ poor peoples’ rights to land. But how do we define the term ‘land securitisation’?

As the objective claimed by most of the initiatives dealt with in this report, it could be understood as strengthening land rights. Many small food producers might conclude that their historic cultural rights to land – however they may be expressed – will be better recognised, thus protecting them from expropriation.

But for many governments and corporations, it means the creation of Western-type land markets based on formal instruments like titles and leases that can be traded. In fact, many initiatives such as the G8 New Alliance explicitly refer to securitisation of ‘investors’ rights to land.

So this is not about recording and safeguarding historic or cultural rights, but about creating market mechanisms. So in a world of grossly unequal players, ‘security’ is shorthand for the power of the market, private property and creditors.

Most of today’s initiatives to address land laws, including those emanating from Africa, are overtly designed to accommodate, support and strengthen investments in land and large scale land deals, rather than achieve equity or to recognise longstanding or historical community rights over land at a time of rising conflicts over land and land resources.

Most of the initiatives to change current land laws come from outside Africa. Yes, African structures like the African Union and the Pan-African Parliament are deeply engaged in facilitating changes to legislation in African states, but many people question how ‘indigenous’ these processes really are.

It is clear that strings are being pulled, by Washington and Europe in particular, in a well orchestrated campaign to alter land governance in Africa.

Seed laws based on neoliberal ideologies

When it comes to seed laws, the picture is reversed. Subregional African bodies – SADC, COMESA, OAPI and the like – are working to create new rules for the exchange and trade of seeds. But the recipes they are applying – seed marketing restrictions and plant variety protection schemes – are borrowed directly from the US and Europe.

And the changes to seed policy being promoted by the G8 New Alliance, the World Bank and others refer to neither farmer-based seed systems nor farmers’ rights. They make no effort to strengthen farming systems that are already functioning.

Rather, the proposed solutions are simplified, but unworkable solutions to complex situations that will not work – though an elite category of farmers may enjoy some small short term benefits.

With seeds, which represent a rich cultural heritage of Africa’s local communities, the push to transform them into income-generating private property, and marginalise traditional varieties, is still making more headway on paper than in practice. This is due to many complexities, one of which is the growing awareness of and popular resistance to the seed industry agenda.

But the resolve of those who intend to turn Africa into a new market for global agro-input suppliers is not to be underestimated, and a notable consolidation of seed suppliers under foreign corporate ownership is under way. The path chosen will have profound implications for the capacity of African farmers to adapt to climate change.

Interconnectedness between different initiatives is significant, although these relationships are not always clear for groups on the ground. Our attempt to show these connections gives a picture of how very narrow agendas are being pushed by a small elite in the service of globalised corporate interests intent on taking over agriculture in Africa.

New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition

“The 50 million people that the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition claims to be lifting out of poverty will only be allowed to escape poverty and hunger if they abandon their traditional rights and practices and buy their life saving seeds every year from the corporations lined up behind the G8”, warned Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement in September 2014.

Launched in 2012 by the G8 industrialised countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and US – the aim of the gtrandly titled G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition is in fact to mobilise private capital for investment in African agriculture.

To be accepted into the programme, African governments are required to make important changes to their land and seed policies. The New Alliance prioritises granting national and transnational corporations (TNCs) new forms of access and control to the participating countries’ resources, and gives them a seat at the same table as aid donors and recipient governments.

As of July 2014, ten African countries had signed Cooperative Framework Agreements (CFAs) to implement the New Alliance programme: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania.

Under these agreements, these governments committed to 213 policy changes. Some 43 of these changes target land laws, with the overall stated objective of establishing “clear, secure and negotiable rights to land” – tradeable property titles.

The New Alliance also aims to implement both the Voluntary Guidelines (VGs) on ‘Responsible Land Tenure‘ adopted by the Committee on World Food Security in 2012, and the ‘Principles for Responsible Agriculture Investment‘ drawn up by the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and UN Conference on Trade and Development. This is considered especially important since the New Alliance directly facilitates access to farmland in Africa for investors.

New Alliance pushing seed ‘reform’

As to seeds, all of the participating states, with the exception of Benin, agreed to adopt plant variety protection laws and rules for marketing seeds that better support the private sector.

Despite the fact that more than 80% of all seed in Africa is still produced and disseminated through ‘informal’ seed systems (on-farm seed saving and unregulated distribution between farmers), there is no recognition in the New Alliance programme of the importance of farmer-based systems of saving, sharing, exchanging and selling seeds.

African governments are being co-opted into reviewing their seed trade laws and supporting the implementation of Plant Variety Protection (PVP) laws, as has been seen in Ghana where farmers have risen up against the changes.

The strategy is to first harmonise seed trade laws such as border control measures, phytosanitary control, variety release systems and certification standards at the regional level, and then move on to harmonising PVP laws.

The effect is to create larger unified seed markets, in which the types of seeds on offer are restricted to commercially protected varieties. The age old rights of farmers to replant saved seed is curtailed and the marketing of traditional varieties of seed is strictly prohibited.

Concerns have been raised about how this agenda privatises seeds and the potential impacts this could have on small-scale farmers. Farmers will lose control of seeds regulated by a commercial system, while crop biodiversity may be eroded due to the focus on commercial varieties.

Making these processes hard to combat is the mutliplicity of programmes and initiatives carried out by different countries and both national and transnational entities in different parts of Africa, all offering short term benefits to governments but all directed towards a single objective – the neoliberal transformation of land, seed and plant variety governance to open the continent up for full scale agribusiness invasion.

 


 

The report:Land and seed laws under attack: who is pushing changes in Africa?‘ was drawn up jointly by AFSA and GRAIN. Researched and initially drafted by Mohamed Coulibaly, an independent legal expert in Mali, with support from AFSA members and GRAIN staff, it is meant to serve as a resource for groups and organisations wanting to become more involved in struggles for land and seed justice across Africa or for those who just want to learn more about who is pushing what kind of changes in these areas right now.

AFSA is a pan-African platform comprising networks and farmer organisations championing small African family farming based on agro-ecological and indigenous approaches that sustain food sovereignty and the livelihoods of communities.

GRAIN is a small international organisation that aims to support small farmers and social movements in their struggles for community-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems.

This article is based on the above report.

 




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‘Incapacitating’ chemical weapons threaten a new arms race Updated for 2026





On October 26 2002, to end a three-day siege on a theatre in Moscow by Chechen terrorists, Russian security forces used a secret incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) weapon believed to affect the central nervous system.

Although most of the 900 people being held hostage were freed, well over 100 of them were killed by the chemical agent; many more continue to suffer long-term health problems.

To this day, the Russian authorities refuse to disclose what weapon they used. Nor will they provide any details of the nature and levels of any incapacitating chemical weapons they may have developed or stockpiled.

But despite the official silence, a new report by the universities of Bradford and Bath documents evidence of continued Russian research into these chemical agents. That research includes computer modelling of ‘calmative gas’ flows in enclosed spaces, as well as studies of the interaction of potential ICAs with human receptor sites.

And Russia is not alone; a number of other states have also conducted research that is potentially applicable to the study or development of ICA weapons. But the international community has turned a collective blind eye to such activities. Apparently, they consider the issue just too difficult to deal with.

The forthcoming Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention next month (December 2014) will be a chance to rectify this omission before more countries become intrigued by these weapons – which would intensify the threat that they will proliferate and be dangerously misused.

These chemicals are dangerous!

There is no agreed definition of incapacitating chemical agents, but they can be described as a disparate range of substances – including pharmaceutical chemicals, bioregulators, and toxins – intended to act on the body’s core biochemical and physiological systems to cause prolonged but non-permanent disability.

They include centrally acting agents, which produce loss of consciousness, sedation, hallucination, incoherence, disorientation, or paralysis. At inappropriate doses, death can result.

Proponents of these weapons have long promoted their development and use in law enforcement; they have also been pushed as a possible tool for military use, especially in locations where civilians and combatants are close together or intermingled.

In contrast, a broad range of observers, including scientific and medical organisations such as the British Medical Association, have pointed out that their production and use presents potentially grave dangers to human health and well-being.

ICA weapons can clearly be used for the purposes of torture and other human rights violations. If their development for law enforcement is tolerated, it could also become an excellent cover for covert offensive chemical weapons programmes, with the danger of further proliferation to both state and non-state actors. That slippery slope could ultimately lead to chemical warfare.

The new Bradford-Bath report examines contemporary research on a range of pharmaceutical chemicals potentially useful for the study or development of ICA weapons.

As well as documenting research by Russian scientists, the report highlights the development and marketing by Chinese companies of ICA weapons employing an unknown anaesthetic agent for use against individuals, and the possession of such weapons in 2012 by the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army.

The report highlights previous research into ICAs by Israel and the notorious use of an ICA weapon as an attempted assassination tool by Mossad on at least one occasion, in 1997. The more recent unconfirmed allegations of ICA weapons use by government forces during the ongoing Syrian civil war]are also explored.

The report also highlights potentially relevant chemical and life science research conducted since 1997 in the Czech Republic, India, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Blurred lines

ICA weapons clearly come under the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in 1997 and which is monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). the use of any toxic chemicals as weapons in armed conflict is absolutely prohibited.

But there are differing interpretations as to whether such toxic chemicals may be employed for law enforcement purposes, and if so, in what circumstances and under what constraints. This ambiguity has never been satisfactorily addressed by the States that are party to the Convention; no OPCW policy-making organ has made any interpretative statements to clarify it.

That leaves CWC signatories to interpret the treaty and raises the risk that a ‘permissive’ interpretation may evolve. And while various countries (including the UK and the US) have formally declared that they are not developing and do not possess ICA weapons, other states that have conducted ICA research remain silent.

If the OPCW does not act decisively to address the situation, more and more countries may start to harness advances in relevant scientific disciplines for ICA weapons development programs – or may be accused of doing so.

And that, in turn, may encourage further states co conduct their own ICA weapons research and development programs – or even to start exploring an even broader range of chemical agents.

There is now a window of opportunity for states to halt the potential proliferation and misuse of these weapons. If they do not, we could face a new type of arms race, and perhaps the erosion of the prohibition on chemical weapons.

 


 

Michael Crowley is Project Coordinator, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project at the University of Bradford.

Malcolm Dando is Professor of International Security at the University of Bradford.

The authors do not individually work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

The Bradford Non-lethal Weapon Research Project is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The Biochemical Security 2030 Project at Bath University is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Futures and Innovation Domain.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386557

‘Incapacitating’ chemical weapons threaten a new arms race Updated for 2026





On October 26 2002, to end a three-day siege on a theatre in Moscow by Chechen terrorists, Russian security forces used a secret incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) weapon believed to affect the central nervous system.

Although most of the 900 people being held hostage were freed, well over 100 of them were killed by the chemical agent; many more continue to suffer long-term health problems.

To this day, the Russian authorities refuse to disclose what weapon they used. Nor will they provide any details of the nature and levels of any incapacitating chemical weapons they may have developed or stockpiled.

But despite the official silence, a new report by the universities of Bradford and Bath documents evidence of continued Russian research into these chemical agents. That research includes computer modelling of ‘calmative gas’ flows in enclosed spaces, as well as studies of the interaction of potential ICAs with human receptor sites.

And Russia is not alone; a number of other states have also conducted research that is potentially applicable to the study or development of ICA weapons. But the international community has turned a collective blind eye to such activities. Apparently, they consider the issue just too difficult to deal with.

The forthcoming Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention next month (December 2014) will be a chance to rectify this omission before more countries become intrigued by these weapons – which would intensify the threat that they will proliferate and be dangerously misused.

These chemicals are dangerous!

There is no agreed definition of incapacitating chemical agents, but they can be described as a disparate range of substances – including pharmaceutical chemicals, bioregulators, and toxins – intended to act on the body’s core biochemical and physiological systems to cause prolonged but non-permanent disability.

They include centrally acting agents, which produce loss of consciousness, sedation, hallucination, incoherence, disorientation, or paralysis. At inappropriate doses, death can result.

Proponents of these weapons have long promoted their development and use in law enforcement; they have also been pushed as a possible tool for military use, especially in locations where civilians and combatants are close together or intermingled.

In contrast, a broad range of observers, including scientific and medical organisations such as the British Medical Association, have pointed out that their production and use presents potentially grave dangers to human health and well-being.

ICA weapons can clearly be used for the purposes of torture and other human rights violations. If their development for law enforcement is tolerated, it could also become an excellent cover for covert offensive chemical weapons programmes, with the danger of further proliferation to both state and non-state actors. That slippery slope could ultimately lead to chemical warfare.

The new Bradford-Bath report examines contemporary research on a range of pharmaceutical chemicals potentially useful for the study or development of ICA weapons.

As well as documenting research by Russian scientists, the report highlights the development and marketing by Chinese companies of ICA weapons employing an unknown anaesthetic agent for use against individuals, and the possession of such weapons in 2012 by the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army.

The report highlights previous research into ICAs by Israel and the notorious use of an ICA weapon as an attempted assassination tool by Mossad on at least one occasion, in 1997. The more recent unconfirmed allegations of ICA weapons use by government forces during the ongoing Syrian civil war]are also explored.

The report also highlights potentially relevant chemical and life science research conducted since 1997 in the Czech Republic, India, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Blurred lines

ICA weapons clearly come under the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in 1997 and which is monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). the use of any toxic chemicals as weapons in armed conflict is absolutely prohibited.

But there are differing interpretations as to whether such toxic chemicals may be employed for law enforcement purposes, and if so, in what circumstances and under what constraints. This ambiguity has never been satisfactorily addressed by the States that are party to the Convention; no OPCW policy-making organ has made any interpretative statements to clarify it.

That leaves CWC signatories to interpret the treaty and raises the risk that a ‘permissive’ interpretation may evolve. And while various countries (including the UK and the US) have formally declared that they are not developing and do not possess ICA weapons, other states that have conducted ICA research remain silent.

If the OPCW does not act decisively to address the situation, more and more countries may start to harness advances in relevant scientific disciplines for ICA weapons development programs – or may be accused of doing so.

And that, in turn, may encourage further states co conduct their own ICA weapons research and development programs – or even to start exploring an even broader range of chemical agents.

There is now a window of opportunity for states to halt the potential proliferation and misuse of these weapons. If they do not, we could face a new type of arms race, and perhaps the erosion of the prohibition on chemical weapons.

 


 

Michael Crowley is Project Coordinator, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project at the University of Bradford.

Malcolm Dando is Professor of International Security at the University of Bradford.

The authors do not individually work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

The Bradford Non-lethal Weapon Research Project is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The Biochemical Security 2030 Project at Bath University is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Futures and Innovation Domain.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386557

‘Incapacitating’ chemical weapons threaten a new arms race Updated for 2026





On October 26 2002, to end a three-day siege on a theatre in Moscow by Chechen terrorists, Russian security forces used a secret incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) weapon believed to affect the central nervous system.

Although most of the 900 people being held hostage were freed, well over 100 of them were killed by the chemical agent; many more continue to suffer long-term health problems.

To this day, the Russian authorities refuse to disclose what weapon they used. Nor will they provide any details of the nature and levels of any incapacitating chemical weapons they may have developed or stockpiled.

But despite the official silence, a new report by the universities of Bradford and Bath documents evidence of continued Russian research into these chemical agents. That research includes computer modelling of ‘calmative gas’ flows in enclosed spaces, as well as studies of the interaction of potential ICAs with human receptor sites.

And Russia is not alone; a number of other states have also conducted research that is potentially applicable to the study or development of ICA weapons. But the international community has turned a collective blind eye to such activities. Apparently, they consider the issue just too difficult to deal with.

The forthcoming Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention next month (December 2014) will be a chance to rectify this omission before more countries become intrigued by these weapons – which would intensify the threat that they will proliferate and be dangerously misused.

These chemicals are dangerous!

There is no agreed definition of incapacitating chemical agents, but they can be described as a disparate range of substances – including pharmaceutical chemicals, bioregulators, and toxins – intended to act on the body’s core biochemical and physiological systems to cause prolonged but non-permanent disability.

They include centrally acting agents, which produce loss of consciousness, sedation, hallucination, incoherence, disorientation, or paralysis. At inappropriate doses, death can result.

Proponents of these weapons have long promoted their development and use in law enforcement; they have also been pushed as a possible tool for military use, especially in locations where civilians and combatants are close together or intermingled.

In contrast, a broad range of observers, including scientific and medical organisations such as the British Medical Association, have pointed out that their production and use presents potentially grave dangers to human health and well-being.

ICA weapons can clearly be used for the purposes of torture and other human rights violations. If their development for law enforcement is tolerated, it could also become an excellent cover for covert offensive chemical weapons programmes, with the danger of further proliferation to both state and non-state actors. That slippery slope could ultimately lead to chemical warfare.

The new Bradford-Bath report examines contemporary research on a range of pharmaceutical chemicals potentially useful for the study or development of ICA weapons.

As well as documenting research by Russian scientists, the report highlights the development and marketing by Chinese companies of ICA weapons employing an unknown anaesthetic agent for use against individuals, and the possession of such weapons in 2012 by the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army.

The report highlights previous research into ICAs by Israel and the notorious use of an ICA weapon as an attempted assassination tool by Mossad on at least one occasion, in 1997. The more recent unconfirmed allegations of ICA weapons use by government forces during the ongoing Syrian civil war]are also explored.

The report also highlights potentially relevant chemical and life science research conducted since 1997 in the Czech Republic, India, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Blurred lines

ICA weapons clearly come under the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in 1997 and which is monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). the use of any toxic chemicals as weapons in armed conflict is absolutely prohibited.

But there are differing interpretations as to whether such toxic chemicals may be employed for law enforcement purposes, and if so, in what circumstances and under what constraints. This ambiguity has never been satisfactorily addressed by the States that are party to the Convention; no OPCW policy-making organ has made any interpretative statements to clarify it.

That leaves CWC signatories to interpret the treaty and raises the risk that a ‘permissive’ interpretation may evolve. And while various countries (including the UK and the US) have formally declared that they are not developing and do not possess ICA weapons, other states that have conducted ICA research remain silent.

If the OPCW does not act decisively to address the situation, more and more countries may start to harness advances in relevant scientific disciplines for ICA weapons development programs – or may be accused of doing so.

And that, in turn, may encourage further states co conduct their own ICA weapons research and development programs – or even to start exploring an even broader range of chemical agents.

There is now a window of opportunity for states to halt the potential proliferation and misuse of these weapons. If they do not, we could face a new type of arms race, and perhaps the erosion of the prohibition on chemical weapons.

 


 

Michael Crowley is Project Coordinator, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project at the University of Bradford.

Malcolm Dando is Professor of International Security at the University of Bradford.

The authors do not individually work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

The Bradford Non-lethal Weapon Research Project is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The Biochemical Security 2030 Project at Bath University is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Futures and Innovation Domain.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386557

‘Incapacitating’ chemical weapons threaten a new arms race Updated for 2026





On October 26 2002, to end a three-day siege on a theatre in Moscow by Chechen terrorists, Russian security forces used a secret incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) weapon believed to affect the central nervous system.

Although most of the 900 people being held hostage were freed, well over 100 of them were killed by the chemical agent; many more continue to suffer long-term health problems.

To this day, the Russian authorities refuse to disclose what weapon they used. Nor will they provide any details of the nature and levels of any incapacitating chemical weapons they may have developed or stockpiled.

But despite the official silence, a new report by the universities of Bradford and Bath documents evidence of continued Russian research into these chemical agents. That research includes computer modelling of ‘calmative gas’ flows in enclosed spaces, as well as studies of the interaction of potential ICAs with human receptor sites.

And Russia is not alone; a number of other states have also conducted research that is potentially applicable to the study or development of ICA weapons. But the international community has turned a collective blind eye to such activities. Apparently, they consider the issue just too difficult to deal with.

The forthcoming Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention next month (December 2014) will be a chance to rectify this omission before more countries become intrigued by these weapons – which would intensify the threat that they will proliferate and be dangerously misused.

These chemicals are dangerous!

There is no agreed definition of incapacitating chemical agents, but they can be described as a disparate range of substances – including pharmaceutical chemicals, bioregulators, and toxins – intended to act on the body’s core biochemical and physiological systems to cause prolonged but non-permanent disability.

They include centrally acting agents, which produce loss of consciousness, sedation, hallucination, incoherence, disorientation, or paralysis. At inappropriate doses, death can result.

Proponents of these weapons have long promoted their development and use in law enforcement; they have also been pushed as a possible tool for military use, especially in locations where civilians and combatants are close together or intermingled.

In contrast, a broad range of observers, including scientific and medical organisations such as the British Medical Association, have pointed out that their production and use presents potentially grave dangers to human health and well-being.

ICA weapons can clearly be used for the purposes of torture and other human rights violations. If their development for law enforcement is tolerated, it could also become an excellent cover for covert offensive chemical weapons programmes, with the danger of further proliferation to both state and non-state actors. That slippery slope could ultimately lead to chemical warfare.

The new Bradford-Bath report examines contemporary research on a range of pharmaceutical chemicals potentially useful for the study or development of ICA weapons.

As well as documenting research by Russian scientists, the report highlights the development and marketing by Chinese companies of ICA weapons employing an unknown anaesthetic agent for use against individuals, and the possession of such weapons in 2012 by the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army.

The report highlights previous research into ICAs by Israel and the notorious use of an ICA weapon as an attempted assassination tool by Mossad on at least one occasion, in 1997. The more recent unconfirmed allegations of ICA weapons use by government forces during the ongoing Syrian civil war]are also explored.

The report also highlights potentially relevant chemical and life science research conducted since 1997 in the Czech Republic, India, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Blurred lines

ICA weapons clearly come under the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in 1997 and which is monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). the use of any toxic chemicals as weapons in armed conflict is absolutely prohibited.

But there are differing interpretations as to whether such toxic chemicals may be employed for law enforcement purposes, and if so, in what circumstances and under what constraints. This ambiguity has never been satisfactorily addressed by the States that are party to the Convention; no OPCW policy-making organ has made any interpretative statements to clarify it.

That leaves CWC signatories to interpret the treaty and raises the risk that a ‘permissive’ interpretation may evolve. And while various countries (including the UK and the US) have formally declared that they are not developing and do not possess ICA weapons, other states that have conducted ICA research remain silent.

If the OPCW does not act decisively to address the situation, more and more countries may start to harness advances in relevant scientific disciplines for ICA weapons development programs – or may be accused of doing so.

And that, in turn, may encourage further states co conduct their own ICA weapons research and development programs – or even to start exploring an even broader range of chemical agents.

There is now a window of opportunity for states to halt the potential proliferation and misuse of these weapons. If they do not, we could face a new type of arms race, and perhaps the erosion of the prohibition on chemical weapons.

 


 

Michael Crowley is Project Coordinator, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project at the University of Bradford.

Malcolm Dando is Professor of International Security at the University of Bradford.

The authors do not individually work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

The Bradford Non-lethal Weapon Research Project is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The Biochemical Security 2030 Project at Bath University is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Futures and Innovation Domain.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




386557

‘Incapacitating’ chemical weapons threaten a new arms race Updated for 2026





On October 26 2002, to end a three-day siege on a theatre in Moscow by Chechen terrorists, Russian security forces used a secret incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) weapon believed to affect the central nervous system.

Although most of the 900 people being held hostage were freed, well over 100 of them were killed by the chemical agent; many more continue to suffer long-term health problems.

To this day, the Russian authorities refuse to disclose what weapon they used. Nor will they provide any details of the nature and levels of any incapacitating chemical weapons they may have developed or stockpiled.

But despite the official silence, a new report by the universities of Bradford and Bath documents evidence of continued Russian research into these chemical agents. That research includes computer modelling of ‘calmative gas’ flows in enclosed spaces, as well as studies of the interaction of potential ICAs with human receptor sites.

And Russia is not alone; a number of other states have also conducted research that is potentially applicable to the study or development of ICA weapons. But the international community has turned a collective blind eye to such activities. Apparently, they consider the issue just too difficult to deal with.

The forthcoming Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention next month (December 2014) will be a chance to rectify this omission before more countries become intrigued by these weapons – which would intensify the threat that they will proliferate and be dangerously misused.

These chemicals are dangerous!

There is no agreed definition of incapacitating chemical agents, but they can be described as a disparate range of substances – including pharmaceutical chemicals, bioregulators, and toxins – intended to act on the body’s core biochemical and physiological systems to cause prolonged but non-permanent disability.

They include centrally acting agents, which produce loss of consciousness, sedation, hallucination, incoherence, disorientation, or paralysis. At inappropriate doses, death can result.

Proponents of these weapons have long promoted their development and use in law enforcement; they have also been pushed as a possible tool for military use, especially in locations where civilians and combatants are close together or intermingled.

In contrast, a broad range of observers, including scientific and medical organisations such as the British Medical Association, have pointed out that their production and use presents potentially grave dangers to human health and well-being.

ICA weapons can clearly be used for the purposes of torture and other human rights violations. If their development for law enforcement is tolerated, it could also become an excellent cover for covert offensive chemical weapons programmes, with the danger of further proliferation to both state and non-state actors. That slippery slope could ultimately lead to chemical warfare.

The new Bradford-Bath report examines contemporary research on a range of pharmaceutical chemicals potentially useful for the study or development of ICA weapons.

As well as documenting research by Russian scientists, the report highlights the development and marketing by Chinese companies of ICA weapons employing an unknown anaesthetic agent for use against individuals, and the possession of such weapons in 2012 by the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army.

The report highlights previous research into ICAs by Israel and the notorious use of an ICA weapon as an attempted assassination tool by Mossad on at least one occasion, in 1997. The more recent unconfirmed allegations of ICA weapons use by government forces during the ongoing Syrian civil war]are also explored.

The report also highlights potentially relevant chemical and life science research conducted since 1997 in the Czech Republic, India, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Blurred lines

ICA weapons clearly come under the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in 1997 and which is monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). the use of any toxic chemicals as weapons in armed conflict is absolutely prohibited.

But there are differing interpretations as to whether such toxic chemicals may be employed for law enforcement purposes, and if so, in what circumstances and under what constraints. This ambiguity has never been satisfactorily addressed by the States that are party to the Convention; no OPCW policy-making organ has made any interpretative statements to clarify it.

That leaves CWC signatories to interpret the treaty and raises the risk that a ‘permissive’ interpretation may evolve. And while various countries (including the UK and the US) have formally declared that they are not developing and do not possess ICA weapons, other states that have conducted ICA research remain silent.

If the OPCW does not act decisively to address the situation, more and more countries may start to harness advances in relevant scientific disciplines for ICA weapons development programs – or may be accused of doing so.

And that, in turn, may encourage further states co conduct their own ICA weapons research and development programs – or even to start exploring an even broader range of chemical agents.

There is now a window of opportunity for states to halt the potential proliferation and misuse of these weapons. If they do not, we could face a new type of arms race, and perhaps the erosion of the prohibition on chemical weapons.

 


 

Michael Crowley is Project Coordinator, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project at the University of Bradford.

Malcolm Dando is Professor of International Security at the University of Bradford.

The authors do not individually work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

The Bradford Non-lethal Weapon Research Project is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The Biochemical Security 2030 Project at Bath University is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Futures and Innovation Domain.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 




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Fracking is driving UK civil and political rights violations Updated for 2026





The UK is faced with extreme energy development that will utilise all three ‘fracking’ technologies: Shale Gas/Oil, Coal Bed Methane (CBM) and Underground Coal Gasification (UCG).

Currently exploration licences cover a relatively small area of land, but roughly a third of the British Isles is being offered to fracking companies as part of the 14th onshore licensing round.

A new report released today by the Bianca Jagger Human Rights Foundation highlights a number of potential human rights impacts for UK citizens should fracking development proceed beyond the exploratory stage.

The human rights implications of extractive activity are being increasingly discussed on the international stage, as concerned citizens demand global leaders take action to modify the excesses of human consumption and consumerism.

The report’s concluding section alludes to issues beyond its scope which we elaborate on here; specifically the violations of civil and political rights that both exploratory and production phases of fracking development will likely entail.

Interviews, online surveys and correspondence with local campaigners have returned a wealth of personal testimony that dispels any suggestion that fracking development’s problems are limited to environmental and human health concerns.

The anti-fracking movement is the fastest growing social movement in the UK with currently over 180 local groups, up from around 30 in 2013. This inconvenient fact poses a problem for a government wanting to go ‘all out for shale’. How has the state reacted so far?

Nationally coordinated suppression?

To date there have been over 400 arrests of peaceful protestors, and data from Balcombe and Barton Moss is suggestive of a nationally coordinated attempt to suppress opposition to shale gas extraction at the expense of domestically and internationally recognised rights.

This campaign has been interpreted by those within the anti-fracking movement as akin to the state response to the 1984-5 Miners’ Strikes through the use of political policing and intimidation of protestors.

Civil and political rights have been primarily infringed by the response of Greater Manchester Police and Sussex Police to peaceful protest at exploratory drilling sites, exhibited most commonly through protestors attempting to delay the arrival of equipment by walking in front of delivery lorries.

The resultant interactions between police and protestors have prompted concerns over the prioritisation of fracking development’s alleged ‘economic benefits’ and provision of short-term ‘energy security’ over the rights of individuals and local communities.

The analysis of interview data indicates that through these actions the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, liberty and security of person, a fair trial, and respect for a private and family life, have been threatened or violated through the use of unnecessary or excessive force, unlawful arrests, covert surveillance of protestors, and intimidation of members of the Anti-fracking movement.

Each of these rights is protected by the Human Rights Act 1998, European Convention on Human Rights, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the UK is legally bound to observe.

Police Violence and arrest quotas

Police interaction with anti-fracking protesters at both Balcombe and Barton Moss involved the use of violence, forcible removal of individuals from the protest site without arrest, and kettling.

Interview respondents described how they were “kicked and pushed and punched”, “pushed and shoved in the back”, “pushed off the road by the police”, and “shoved in the back repeatedly”. Police behavior was described as “brutal”, “violent”, “thuggish”, “rough”, and “very, very aggressive”, resulting in interactions in which a bone got broken.

The use of physical violence was widely reported amongst interview and survey respondents, indicating unlawful police activity at both Balcombe and Barton Moss that directly impacted upon the ability of anti-fracking protestors to realise one of their fundamental civil and political rights.

This violence was accompanied by other forms of unlawful activity to inhibit anti-fracking protest activity at both sites.

References were made in several interviews to the concept of arrest quotas, whereby police would carry out specific numbers of arrests over consecutive days.

At Barton Moss, throughout the autumn and winter of 2013, one interview respondent recalled how “there were five arrests every day”, and that “Officers were heard to say ‘We need one more arrest’.”

The same respondent believed that the use of arrest quotas was “almost certainly planned in advance”, and designed as “a long term plan” which would ensure that “eventually everyone would be arrested”.

More explicitly, the respondent explained how such patterns of arrests effectively worked, as “you’re arrested, you get bailed, next time you get arrested in breach of bail. Over a period of time, such a cycle would decrease the effectiveness of the protest camp’s actions and increase the likelihood of its disbandment.”

Arrests were also described as “clearly random”, “quite random”, and “completely random”, with one respondent expressing the most telling sentiment, that: “there was a risk that at any time you could be arrested”. Such arrests were believed to be used as a way of “undermining people’s morale”.

Spurious arrests

In addition to arrest quotas and arbitrary arrests, allegations were made by an interview respondent of arrests being knowingly made on unlawful charges by Greater Manchester Police.

At Barton Moss, delivery lorries travelled down Barton Moss Lane to reach the IGas drilling site, a designated private road with footpath access for the public. The respondent described how police made arrests on Barton Moss Lane for “the crime of obstructing a public highway”, an entirely unlawful charge given that the road is private and therefore does not constitute a public highway.

Significantly, the respondent described how, at a court hearing of individuals charged with the crime of obstruction of a public highway in November 2013, “a solicitor informed the court that Barton Moss Lane was a private road which has public footpath access”, but Greater Manchester Police “continued to make arrests. under that crime until […] February.”

This meant that, as expressed by the respondent, “for nearly three months they continued to arrest for a crime that wasn’t a crime”.

Many arrests appear to have been made under what were somewhat spurious claims. For example, interview respondents detailed how at both Balcombe and Barton Moss, while escorting delivery lorries to the exploratory drilling sites, protestors were arrested for “obstructing a police officer” if they fell over.

These arrests were justified under the premise that “if you fall down in front of a police officer you are obstructing him from moving down the road”. Such interactions between police and protestors prompted frustrations, but also fears.

Monitoring of Communications

Several interview respondents raised concerns of police surveillance of email accounts, telephones and social media.

Although, as one interview respondent indicated, such activities are “difficult to prove”, other interview respondents were insistent in their belief of surveillance activity, stating that “We knew that they were monitoring our Facebook pages, our emails and our phones”, and “I have no doubt that they were bugging certain people’s phones” and “keeping a close eye on people’s Facebook pages”.

Concerns for some anti-fracking protestors over the security of information were such that one interview respondent described how, when important details about protest action required discussion, the individuals involved would “get together and speak about it rather than using [social] media.”

Seemingly to confirm fears of surveillance, another respondent described how a list of press contacts on an email account were “scrambled”, preventing messages from reaching the majority of the list’s recipients.

The use of covert surveillance has prompted fears of how intelligence gathered by Greater Manchester Police and Sussex Police has been shared nationally, with explicit reference made by one interview respondent to the Domestic Extremist Unit.

Another correspondent reported having been visited at home by two members of the Counter Terrorism and Domestic Extremism Unit after filming at a potential drilling site. The visit, according to the two “officers”, was made on the request of a local police force who in turn received their request from the firm’s “security personnel”.

It seems that behind such examples of close cooperation and coordination between ‘fracking’ firms, the state and police forces lies a specific intent to intimidate and deter individuals involved in protest or related activities.

Democratic freedoms eroded

The explicit violations of rights in the context of anti-fracking protests fit within a wider discussion of democracy, and concern the right to public participation, which is protected in matters of environmental impact by the Aarhus Convention.

The increasing opposition to fracking, evidenced in the growing plethora of local campaign groups across the UK, indicates governmental failure to adequately respond to local and national concerns over the human rights implications of fracking or provide sufficient opportunities for public participation in decision making.

Both interview and survey respondents have expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of governmental consideration of public concerns, stating variously that “The government are not listening to people”, “the government refuses to engage and consult with the public”, “The government is ignoring the will of the people”, and “we have never been consulted”.

These comments indicate a deeper concern with the denial of citizen participation in a democratic society, with survey respondents describing how “democracy appears to be disregarded completely”, and that the process of introducing fracking in the UK “is eroding our democracy”.

With specific respect to public opinion, one survey respondent described how, when the application for exploratory drilling was made by Cuadrilla in Balcombe, and the local council requested residents’ opinions, “899 letters against it […], 5 for and they still went for it”.

This example demonstrates a particular disregard for the individuals living in proximity to exploratory sites, and indicates how individuals have become disillusioned with official avenues of complaint.

Fundamental rights are at risk

Not all anti-fracking activity in the UK has been ‘lawful’ as such, and has included the occupation of Cuadrilla’s offices in Blackpool and the blockading of roads to exploratory drilling sites.

Although instances of direct action which technically violate domestic law are not protected by international human rights legislation, these events indicate the extent to which individuals are sufficiently disillusioned with governmental policy to consider and undertake ‘illegal’ action.

Acts of both civil disobedience and peaceful protest will occur with increasing frequency as local communities realise the extent of the extractive industry’s impact.

This indicates the vital nature of further human rights based research into the planning, implementation and infrastructure of fracking development, and the need for genuinely independent human rights impact assessments for all communities before any extractive activity begins in the UK.

The civil and political implications of fracking development in the UK will only intensify as anti-fracking protests proliferate alongside exploratory activity.

The rights violations described above must therefore prompt both public awareness and governmental response to the reality that fracking development can no longer be considered in separation from the civil and political sphere, as personal testimony indicates the extent to which fundamental rights of UK citizens who oppose governmental policy are at risk.

As the report concludes, “for the UK Government to proceed with fracking without adequate assessment of the human rights position would amount to a serious failure of responsibility.”

 


 

The report: A Human Rights Assessment of Hydraulic Fracturing and Other Unconventional Gas Development in the United Kingdom is launched today.

Also on The Ecologist:


Jess Elliot
is a Research Associate at the Human Rights Consortium, School of Advanced Study, University of London.

Damien Short is a Reader in Human Rights at the School of Advanced Study, University of London and Director of the School’s MA programme in Understanding and Securing Human Rights, Human Rights Consortium and Extreme Energy Initiative.

This article is an extended version of one originally published today on The Conversation.

For further information on violations of civil and political rights in the context of anti-fracking protests in the UK, please look out for the forthcoming Short et al, 2014, International Journal of Human Rights, December 2014.

The Conversation

 




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Housing against nightingales – no way! Updated for 2026





Bad news I am afraid. The RSPB has been campaigning to stop a development of 5,000 houses on Chattenden Woods and Lodge Hill SSSI.

This ex-MOD training ground is home to a nationally important population of nightingales – possibly the most important site in the UK for this iconic and declining species – as well as ancient woodland and rare grassland.

Last Friday, Medway Council made the decision to approve the application from Land Securities, MoD’s delivery partner.

The vote to approve the development goes against the advice of Natural England, the government’s own environmental advisors, as well as a raft of conservation organisations.

A shocking decision

If the development goes ahead it would destroy the SSSI including the home to more than 1% of our national nightingale population.

Worse – it would set the terrible precedent for future development. Under the terms of the National Planning Policy Framework (Clause 118), there is a presumption against building on SSSIs – our most important wildlife sites.

The public benefits from the development need to significantly outweigh the environmental damage. Houses which are important locally must not trump nationally important wildlife sites.

The Secretary of State, Eric Pickles, can ‘call in’ the application and make the decision himself with the national perspective it needs. In effect this would take the decision out of Medway’s hands, and allow it to be made through the rigorous process of a public inquiry.

We’ll be reminding him that if the development goes ahead, it will be one of the largest losses of SSSI land in the country – perhaps the biggest loss since the mid-1990s. This is not what we’d expect from ‘the greenest government ever’. Not only that, but it would be contrary to the Government’s own guidance on developing protected sites.

It is clear that Medway is in need of housing and employment, but these needs should be assessed through a thorough strategic review. Reliance on a single proposal at Lodge Hill is not the answer to providing a sustainable long-term solution.

The more I think about it, the angrier I get

Now, if Mr Pickles fails to call in the decision and fails to grant a public inquiry, then this would send a terrible signal to others looking to meet housing targets.

The Labour Party, for example, have said that by 2020 we should be building 200,000 new houses a year. If every block of 5,000 new houses happened to coincide with a SSSI, we could lose 40 SSSIs a year.

I know what you’re thinking – this is hyperbole, this cannot happen as not all new houses will be built on SSSIs. But, if the Lodge Hill development goes ahead then developers might just chance their arm and the consequences could be appalling for wildlife.

And, given that this is public land (Ministry of Defence), what happens to future public land of high environmental value? Can that also be sold off for development? I expect higher standards from the State.

And the Lodge Hill decision struck a discordant note after such a positive week. On Tuesday, we had been celebrating with Medway Council over the decision by The Davies Commission to rule out a Thames Estuary Airport.

And, on Wednesday, it had been a pleasure to hear positive commitments to restore nature from so many businesses, politicians and religious leaders at our Conference for Nature.

The original intention of the Today programme (which covered the Lodge Hill story on Saturday morning – see here at 7.32) had been to reflect on the juxtaposition of these events.

‘Back to the future’ on nature conservation?

But as I thought about possible responses, I felt the Lodge Hill decision was another reminder that the war continues. Fifteen years ago, we coined the phrase ‘stop the rot, protect the best and restore the rest’.

The optimists amongst us hoped that we would be spending more of our efforts recovering populations of threatened species and restoring wildlife at a landscape scale. We have done some of this (and need / want to do lots more) but the reality is we still have to fight hard to prevent even our finest wildlife sites from deteriation or destruction.

The verbal commitments made on Wednesday will ring hollow unless they are backed up by action. Our regional director in the south-east, Chris Corrigan, rightly said to me at the weekend:

“There is a housing need but if we are going to solve this by building on the 6% of our most precious land for wildlife we cannot possibly reverse the continuing erosion of nature and what kind of country we will leave for future generations.”

I am hopeful that the Labour Party will address the false conflict of housing and the environment through its Lyons review, to which the RSPB’s Head of Planning is contributing. Simon has some smart ideas which he is feeding in.

I’m also hopeful that Mark Reckless, the local Conservative MP who opposes the Lodge Hill development, will help persuade his colleague Eric Pickles to call Medway’s decision.

Time for a Nature Act – and you know who to vote for …

Decisions like Medway’s send us back to the mid-1990s when the environment movement climbed into the trees to oppose the expanding road network. We may have to do so again, but in 21st century England we deserve a different agenda.

This is why I am pleased we now have two political parties – the Liberal Democrats and, after their conference this weekend, the Green Party – promising a Nature Act after the next election. We should be investing our energies in restoring nature, rather than destroying it.

The good news is, as I found out at the ‘Vision for Nature’ conference on Friday, the next generation of environmentalists are more passionate, more determined and (from what I can tell) more impressive that the current crop.

They’ll need to be. We’re leaving our natural world in a mess and, if we carry on as we are, it will be for them to clean it up.

 


 

Martin Harper is Conservation Director of RSPB. He blogs on the RSPB website.

Please help us: tell Eric Pickles why this decision matters, and ask him to call it in.

Catch up with the whole history of the case on our Lodge Hill web pages.

This article is based on two blog posts by Martin Harper on the RSPB website.

 

 




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